

23 APRIL 1947

I N D E X  
of  
WITNESSES

<u>Defense' Witnesses</u>	<u>Page</u>
WACHI, Tsunezo (resumed)	20574
(Witness excused)	20574
WACHI, Takaji	20575
Direct by Mr. Levin	20575
(Witness excused)	20589
<u>MORNING RECESS</u>	20609
HASHIMOTO, Gun	20609
Direct by Mr. Levin	20609
Cross by Judge Nyi	20637
<u>NOON RECESS</u>	20641
Cross by Judge Nyi (cont'd)	20642
<u>AFTERNOON RECESS</u>	20664
Cross by Judge Nyi (cont'd)	20665
(Witness excused)	20668
TANAKA, Shinichi	20668
Direct by Mr. Levin	20668

23 APRIL 1947

I N D E X  
of  
EXHIBITS

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Def. No.</u>	<u>Pros. No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For Ident.</u>	<u>In Evidence</u>
1003	2482		Affidavit of WACHI, Takaji		20576
1144	2483		Note on the Dissolution of the Provisional Government of Tientsin		20592
1143	2484		Note of Acceptance of the Terms of the Dissolution of the Provisionsional Government of Tientsin, dated 18 July 1902		20599
956	2485		Resolutions Adopted by the Diplomatic Body at Peking re Military Occupation of the Rail- way from Peking to Shanhaikuan		20602
891	2486		Declaration of the President of China Relating to Respecting of Treaties, Agreements and Vested Rights, dated 10 October 1913		20605
973	2487		Affidavit of HASHIMOTO, Gun		20611
925	2488		Affidavit of TANAKA, Shinichi		20669

1 Wednesday, 23 April 1947

2 - - -

3  
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
5 FOR THE FAR EAST  
6 Court House of the Tribunal  
7 War Ministry Building  
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, same as before.

14 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

15 For the Defense Section, same as before.

16 - - -

17 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
18 to English interpretation was made by the  
19 Language Section, IMTFE.)  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25



M  
o  
r  
s  
e  
&  
W  
o  
l  
f

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present  
4 except TOGO and HIRANUMA who are represented by  
5 counsel. The prison surgeon at Sugamo certifies  
6 that they are too ill to attend the trial today. The  
7 certificate will be recorded and filed.  
8

9 The Stars and Stripes report of yesterday's  
10 proceedings is so full of serious inaccuracies that  
11 if the Tribunal did and said the things attributed  
12 to it in the report it would deserve instant dis-  
13 missal.

14 Fortunately the court reporters made a  
15 report which does not call for a single correction.  
16 The Stars and Stripes report was made by a press  
17 correspondent who is generally completely reliable  
18 and I attribute the inaccuracies in the report to  
19 the faulty condition of the IBM yesterday.

20 I refer to a few of the most serious errors.  
21 The press report states the Court rejected two  
22 paragraphs, whereas, only one was rejected. It states  
23 the Court, to show its tolerance, admitted a certain  
24 paragraph. It did no such thing. It says the President  
25 stated he would keep in mind gratuitous insults



WACHI, T.

1 offered to the Allied countries. The President  
2 did not say that, but he did say he would not  
3 permit such gratuitous insults.

4 The press correspondent is asked by the  
5 Tribunal to consult the official record and secure  
6 the necessary corrections in the newspaper and in  
7 any transmission overseas.

8 Mr. Levin.

9 - - -

10 T S U N E Z O W A C H I, called as witness on  
11 behalf of the defense, resumed the stand  
12 and testified through Japanese interpreters  
13 as follows:

14 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, we have concluded  
15 with the witness and the prosecution may now examine,  
16 if they desire.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

18 MR. TAVENNER: If it please the Tribunal,  
19 the prosecution does not desire to cross-examine.

20 THE PRESIDENT: The witness is at liberty  
21 on the usual terms.

22 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

23 MR. LEVIN: We now call the witness, WACHI,  
24 Takaji.  
25

- - -

1 T A K A J I W A C H I, called as a witness on  
2 behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,  
3 testified through Japanese interpreters as  
4 follows:

## DIRECT EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. LEVIN:

7 Q Please state your name, age and address.

8 A WACHI, Takaji; 54; Sugamo Prison.

9 Q The Marshal will hand you defense document  
10 No. 1003. Will you please state whether your  
11 signature appears thereon?

12 (Whereupon, the document above  
13 referred to was handed to the witness.)

14 A This is mine. This is my affidavit.

15 Q Are the contents of said document true and  
16 correct?

17 A There is some mistake in one point.

18 Q Will you please state what that is?

19 A The mistake appears in paragraph 11 which  
20 states that there was six thousand Japanese within  
21 the walls of Peiping. It should be three thousand  
22 instead of six thousand.

23 Q With that correction is the statement true  
24 and correct?

25 A Yes.

WACHI

DIRECT

20,575

1 T A K A J I W A C H I, called as a witness on  
2 behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,  
3 testified through Japanese interpreters as  
4 follows:

5 DIRECT EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. LEVIN:

7 Q Please state your name, age and address?

8 A WACHI, Takaji, 54 Sugamo prison.

9 Q The Marshal will hand you defense document  
10 No. 1003. Will you please state whether your  
11 signature appears thereon?

12 (Whereupon, the document above re-  
13 ferred to was handed to the witness.)

14 A This is mine. This is my affidavit.

15 Q Are the contents of said document true and  
16 correct?

17 A There is some mistake in one point.

18 Q Will you please state what that is?

19 A The mistake appears in paragraph 11 which  
20 states that there was six thousand Japanese within  
21 the walls of Peiping. It should be three thousand  
22 instead of six thousand,

23 Q With that correction is the statement true  
24 and correct?

25 A Yes.



WACHI

DIRECT

1 MR. LEVIN: We now offer in evidence  
2 defense document No. 1003 with the corrections as  
3 stated.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No.  
6 1003 will receive exhibit No. 2482.

7 (Whereupon, the document above re-  
8 ferred to was marked defense exhibit No.  
9 2482 and received in evidence.)

10 MR. LEVIN: I think the Tribunal will re-  
11 call that this witness appeared in a previous phase  
12 of the case.

13 Omitting the formal parts I begin to read  
14 the affidavit:

15 "1. I was formerly a lieutenant-general  
16 in the Japanese Army and am now being confined at  
17 Sugamo prison.

18 "2. I was at Tientsin as a senior staff-  
19 officer of the Japanese Garrison Army in China from  
20 August of 1936 to the end of July 1937. I was in  
21 charge of Intelligence.

22 "3. Therefore, personally experiencing and  
23 understanding the state of affairs in North China  
24 before and at the time of the Lukouchiao Incident  
25 which occurred on July 7, 1937, I should like to

WACHI

DIRECT

1 state the following facts for reference.

2 "4. First, I will give a few facts for  
3 information on the situation in North China prior  
4 to the Incident. Around August of 1936 when I arrived  
5 at Tientsin to take my new post, there were many  
6 unemployed soldiers of the Northeast Army (Chang  
7 Hsueh-Liang's Army) infiltrating into North China.  
8 Ma Chan-shan was also in Tientsin. One day I met  
9 him at the home of Fan-fu at the English Concession.  
10 The fact that many of these unemployed soldiers had  
11 joined the Kintung Government Army was also related  
12 in the talk by GORO, Araki who was formerly the  
13 advisor of Chang Hsueh-liang in Pei-ping. 'In  
14 order to attack the Communist Army in Northwest China,  
15 Chang Hsueh-liang himself and the Northeast Army were  
16 dispatched but these officers and men of the North-  
17 east Army communicated with the Communist Army  
18 saying that their enemy was Japan and since Japan  
19 was also the enemy of the Communist Army, they should  
20 not fight each other. For that reason, the subjugation  
21 of the Communist Army did not progress. Therefore,  
22 in order to encourage the punitive forces, Chang-  
23 Kai-shek himself went to Siam Incident occurred',  
24 stated Ma Chan-shan to Hsia Menyun, my secretary.  
25 Also, these facts stated above were confirmed by

WACHI

DIRECT

1 other intelligence reports which I gathered." --

2 THE PRESIDENT: Is that correct?

3 MR. LEVIN: I don't believe so, Mr. President.

4 I tried to read it as it appeared in the document  
5 itself, but it doesn't make good sense. I suggest  
6 that the matter be referred to the Language Section  
7 for such corrections as might be necessary.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Siam, S-i-a-m, and that too  
9 should be "n", I think. The word before Siam --  
10 however, we will try to spell out of it what meaning  
11 is intended.

12 MR. LEVIN: (Reading continued)

13 "5. In the spring of 1937 I met Han Fu-cha  
14 at Tsinan. He told me that he received an unofficial  
15 notification from the central authority that war  
16 would break out between Japan and China in the  
17 autumn of that year, and that at that time he had  
18 to go to Tientsin. However, he stated that if he  
19 should go to Tientsin, the base of Shantung would  
20 be captured during his absence. So, for the reason  
21 that the Japanese Army might also land at Tsing-  
22 tao, we should advance to Meihsien.

23 "6. From about the spring of 1937 (the  
24 12th year of Showa) the attitude of Sung Che-yuan,  
25 Chairman of the Kieha Political Committee became



WACHI

DIRECT

1 other intelligence reports which I gathered." --

2 THE PRESIDENT: Is that correct?

3 MR. LEVIN: I don't believe so, Mr. President.

4 I tried to read it as it appeared in the document  
5 itself, but it doesn't make good sense. I suggest  
6 that the matter be referred to the Language Section  
7 for such corrections as might be necessary.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Siam, S-i-a-m, and that too  
9 should be "n", I think. The word before Siam --  
10 however, we will try to spell out of it what meaning  
11 is intended.

12 MR. LEVIN: (Reading continued)

13 "5. In the spring of 1937 I met Han Fu-cha  
14 at Tsinan. He told me that he received an unofficial  
15 notification from the central authority that war  
16 would break out between Japan and China in the  
17 autumn of that year, and that at that time he had  
18 to go to Tientsin. However, he stated that if he  
19 should go to Tientsin, the base of Shantung would  
20 be captured during his absence. So, for the reason  
21 that the Japanese Army might also land at Tsing-  
22 tao, we should advance to Meihsien.

23 "6. From about the spring of 1937 (the  
24 12th year of Showa) the attitude of Sung Che-yuan,  
25 Chairman of the Kieha Political Committee became

DIRECT

20,579

more inclined to be anti-Japanese. There was no assistance when I tried to have an interview with the Military Officers Club at Tientsin, who lied that he could not meet me there as the building had been contributed by Yen (who was pro-Japanese). Communist troops gradually joined the third division of my army under Sung Che-yuan's command. Meanwhile, on the side of Japan, Vice-chief of the Staff, NISHIO, Toshizo, summoned Colonel (Shanghai), Major OBASHI of the Kwantung Army, and himself of the Japanese Army stationed in Shanghai, and instructed us to assume a passive attitude and that we should not cause a disturbance in China.

Military Operations of the General Staff. Headquarters at that time was Major General (Shanghai).

I also informed him fully about our cautious attitude in North China.

After I returned to my post in Tientsin, the attitude of the Japanese Army stationed in Shanghai according to the purport of the message which I received at Tokyo. Shortly thereafter, Colonel OKAMOTO, Kivofuku came to the Headquarters of the General Staff

1 more and more inclined to be anti-Japanese. There  
2 was an instance when I tried to have an interview  
3 with him at the Military Officers Club at Tientsin,  
4 but he replied that he could not meet me there  
5 because that building had been contributed by Yen  
6 Ju-keng (who was pro-Japanese). Communist troops  
7 began even gradually to join the third division of  
8 the 29th Army under Sung Che-yuan's command. Mean-  
9 while, on the side of Japan, Vice-chief of the  
10 General Staff, NISHIO, Toshizo, summoned Colonel  
11 KUSUMOTO of Shanghai, Major OBASHI of the Kwantung  
12 Army and myself of the Japanese Army stationed in  
13 North China and instructed us to assume a passive  
14 attitude lest we should cause a disturbance in China.  
15 The Chief of Military Operations of the General  
16 Staff Headquarters at that time was Major General  
17 ISHIHARA, Kanji.

18 "I also informed him fully about our cautious  
19 attitude in North China.

20 "7. After I returned to my post in Tientsin,  
21 I guided the attitude of the Japanese Army stationed  
22 in North China according to the purport of the  
23 instructions which I received at Tokyo. Shortly  
24 after, Lieutenant Colonel OKAMOTO, Kiyofuku came to  
25 Tientsin from the Headquarters of the General Staff



1 more and more inclined to be anti-Japanese. There  
2 was an instance when I tried to have an interview  
3 with him at the Military Officers Club at Tientsin,  
4 but he replied that he could not meet me there  
5 because that building had been contributed by Yan  
6 Ju-keng (who was pro-Japanese). Communist troops  
7 began even gradually to join the third division of  
8 the 29th Army under Sung Che-yuan's command. Mean-  
9 while, on the side of Japan, Vice-chief of the  
10 General Staff, NI-HIO, Toshizo, summoned Colonel  
11 KUSUMOTO of Shanghai, Major OBAHI of the Kwantung  
12 Army and myself of the Japanese Army stationed in  
13 North China and instructed us to assume a passive  
14 attitude lest we should cause a disturbance in China.  
15 The Chief of Military Operations of the General  
16 Staff Headquarters at that time was Major General  
17 I-HIHARA, Kanji.

18 "I also informed him fully about our cautious  
19 attitude in North China.

20 "7. After I returned to my post in Tientsin,  
21 I guided the attitude of the Japanese Army stationed  
22 in North China according to the purport of the  
23 instructions which I received at Tokyo. Shortly  
24 after, Lieutenant Colonel OKAMOTO, Kiyofuku came to  
25 Tientsin from the Headquarters of the General Staff

1 and, upon his return after inspecting the state of  
2 affairs of the Japanese garrison in China, he expressed  
3 relief that there were absolutely no signs to  
4 indicate that our side was ready to cause any dis-  
5 turbances.

6 "8. The Lukouchiao Incident, as is well  
7 known, occurred on 7 July 1937, but at that time  
8 Lieutenant General TA-HIRO of the Japanese Army in  
9 China had been in bed suffering from heart-asthma  
10 since several months before and he was absolutely  
11 unable to command his army. He was so seriously  
12 ill that he died on the 9th of that month. For the  
13 purpose of inspection, the main force of the 2nd  
14 Infantry Regiment stationed at Tientsin was dispatched  
15 to Shanhaikwan. A greater part of the battalion  
16 stationed at Peiping was also at Tung-chow. Major  
17 General KAWABE, Shozo, the Commander of the Infantry  
18 Brigade at Peiping, together with his subordinates  
19 had left Peiping on his way to Shanhaikwan on official  
20 business. The amount of arms,ammunition and military  
21 supplies in storage at Tientsin which was" -- I presume  
22 -- "at the Japanese Garrison Base was exceedingly  
23 low.

24 "9. I received a report of the outbreak  
25 of the Lukouchiao Incident at mid-night on 7 July.

WACHI

DIRECT

20,581

1 I was ordered to proceed to the spot by HASHII OTO,  
2 Gun, Chief Staff Officer, and on the following day  
3 I went to Tung-chow by airplane, and from Tung-chow  
4 I entered Pei-ping by car. At Pei-ping I participated  
5 in the settlement of the incident at the spot where  
6 it occurred with Colonel MATSUI, Takuro. This  
7 negotiation was settled the following day on the 9th.  
8 As to the settlement of the incident at that spot,  
9 the conditions were like conditions of infringement,  
10 that is, the incident was settled in the morning  
11 on the condition that China withdraw her troops to  
12 the Lukouchiao Castle and the grounds around the  
13 castle and punish the responsible persons.  
14



1 "10. Since the aforementioned agreement was  
2 achieved, I returned to Tientsin to my post via Tung-  
3 chow, and at Tung-chow I met Yin Ju-king and HASAKI  
4 (Adviser to Ki-tung Government).

5 "At this time Yin said that he was going to  
6 muster six battalions of his command at Tung-chow.  
7 These six battalions later caused the Tung-chow  
8 Incident which occurred on the 29th of this month.

9 "11. After returning to my post at Tientsin,  
10 I went to Tokyo on official business by order from  
11 Tokyo, and I reported the situation at the scene of the  
12 incident to the General Staff Headquarters and the  
13 War Ministry.

14 "At that time I reported to TANAKA, Shinichi,  
15 Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry  
16 as follows:

17 "Under the Japanese North China Army  
18 Authorities, the policy of non-expansion and peaceful  
19 settlement is being driven home well. For example,  
20 due to the stimulus accorded to the Chinese, the  
21 railroad between Pei-ping and Tientsin is prohibited  
22 to transport of Japanese troops; the railroad between  
23 Fengtai and Pei-ping is also not permitting Japanese  
24 troops in uniform to ride; all Japanese passing  
25 through the Yungting gate are tolerating

DIRECT

inter

thor

wh

t

Military Police; six

" (I presume that is

made which was from 6,000

Pei-ping Castle are being

two or three platoons of our

of the existing condition whereby

-guns are trained on the Japanese

in the Pei-ping Castle; we also refrained

transporting the wounded into the Pei-ping Castle

urgical operations and the corpses of those

ed in action are being neglected. Moreover, in

regards to the artillery bombardment by the Chinese,

a condition exists whereby it would be possible to fight

back immediately. But, in spite of all these facts,

I am complying fully with the orders of the Army

Headquarters at Tientsin and submitting myself to com-

plete humiliation and inconvenience. I am strictly

prohibiting action which may act as a provocation to

the spread of the incident.'

"11. After completing the aforementioned

report, I returned to North China about noon on July

28. There I was informed by Major-General GIGA, the

Chief of the Air Group, that the 29th Army had attacked

our units at Fengtai the day before, on July 27.

Today, the 28th, Tientsin was attacked by Chinese

1 interrogation by the Chinese Military Police; six  
2 thousand Japanese nationals" (I presume that is  
3 where the correction was made which was from 6,000  
4 to 3,000) "within the Pei-ping Castle are being  
5 guarded by merely two or three platoons of our  
6 infantry because of the existing condition whereby  
7 Chinese machine-guns are trained on the Japanese  
8 houses within the Pei-ping Castle; we also refrained  
9 from transporting the wounded into the Pei-ping Castle  
10 for surgical operations and the corpses of those  
11 killed in action are being neglected. Moreover, in  
12 regards to the artillery bombardment by the Chinese,  
13 a condition exists whereby it would be possible to fight  
14 back immediately. But, in spite of all these facts,  
15 I am complying fully with the orders of the Army  
16 Headquarters at Tientsin and submitting myself to com-  
17 plete humiliation and inconvenience. I am strictly  
18 prohibiting action which may act as a provocation to  
19 the spread of the incident.'

21 "11. After completing the aforementioned  
22 report, I returned to North China about noon on July  
23 28. There I was informed by Major-General GIGA, the  
24 Chief of the Air Group, that the 29th Army had attacked  
25 our units at Fengtai the day before, on July 27.  
Today, the 28th, Tientsin was attacked by Chinese



1 interrogation by the Chinese Military Police; six  
2 thousand Japanese nationals" (I presume that is  
3 where the correction was made which was from 6,000  
4 to 3,000) "within the Pei-ping Castle are being  
5 guarded by merely two or three platoons of our  
6 infantry because of the existing condition whereby  
7 Chinese machine-guns are trained on the Japanese  
8 houses within the Pei-ping Castle; we also refrained  
9 from transporting the wounded into the Pei-ping Castle  
10 for surgical operations and the corpses of those  
11 killed in action are being neglected. Moreover, in  
12 regards to the artillery bombardment by the Chinese,  
13 a condition exists whereby it would be possible to fight  
14 back immediately. But in spite of all these facts,  
15 I am complying fully with the orders of the Army  
16 Headquarters at Tientsin and submitting myself to com-  
17 plete humiliation and inconvenience. I am strictly  
18 prohibiting action which may act as a provocation to  
19 the spread of the incident.'

20 "11. After completing the aforementioned  
21 report, I returned to North China about noon on July  
22 28. There I was informed by Major General GIGA, the  
23 Chief of the Air Group, that the 29th Army had attacked  
24 our units at Fungtai the day before, on July 27.  
25 Today, the 28th, Tientsin was attacked by Chinese

1 interrogation by the Chinese Military Police; six  
2 thousand Japanese nationals" (I presume that is  
3 where the correction was made which was from 6,000  
4 to 3,000) "within the Pei-ping Castle are being  
5 guarded by merely two or three platoons of our  
6 infantry because of the existing condition whereby  
7 Chinese machine-guns are trained on the Japanese  
8 houses within the Pei-ping Castle; we also refrained  
9 from transporting the wounded into the Pei-ping Castle  
10 for surgical operations and the corpses of those  
11 killed in action are being neglected. Moreover, in  
12 regards to the artillery bombardment by the Chinese,  
13 a condition exists whereby it would be possible to fight  
14 back immediately. But in spite of all these facts,  
15 I am complying fully with the orders of the Army  
16 Headquarters at Tientsin and submitting myself to com-  
17 plete humiliation and inconvenience. I am strictly  
18 prohibiting action which may act as a provocation to  
19 the spread of the incident.'

20 "11. After completing the aforementioned  
21 report, I returned to NorthChina about noon on July  
22 28. There I was informed by Major General GIGA, the  
23 Chief of the Air Group, that the 29th Army had attacked  
24 our units at Fungtai the day before, on July 27.  
25 Today, the 28th, Tientsin was attacked by Chinese

WACHI

DIRECT

1 troops and consequently communication between Tientsin  
2 air base and the Tientsin Occupation Army was temporarily  
3 severed. Then I was able to return to our original  
4 headquarters on the 29th of the same month.

5 "12. While I was on official business in  
6 Tokyo, Mr. NAKASHIMA (Tetsuo), the Chief of the  
7 General Affairs Department of the General Staff  
8 Headquarters, informally ordered me to become the  
9 Regimental Commander of the 44th Infantry Regiment  
10 (Kochi) because the emergency in North China was almost  
11 settled. However, on August 1 there was a formal  
12 order issued and I took up my duties as the commander  
13 of the aforesaid regiment.

14 "13. About August 10, 1937 I arrived at  
15 the place where the 44th Regiment had been stationed.  
16 Three days after my appointment, however, I received  
17 an urgent mobilization order and was sent to Shanghai.  
18 There I served in the field in the battle of Shanghai  
19 and after this, in March 1938, I returned to Japan.  
20 I was attached to General Staff Headquarters and given  
21 a special assignment in China. Consequently I went  
22 to Tokyo and, presenting myself at General Staff Head-  
23 quarters, received my orders. My assignment was to  
24 have a talk with the Chiang Government to put an end  
25 to the Incident.



WACHI

DIRECT

1           "14. In June 1938, I went to Hong Kong. At  
2 the same time I tried to negotiate with the Chiang  
3 Government through Hsieh-Chenying in North China whom  
4 I knew. They seemed to be looking forward to the  
5 matter being settled before the fall of Hankow. At  
6 last we reached a single plan. It was as follows:  
7 The Manchurian problem be tabled to the future;  
8 terminate fighting in China; the Personal elements  
9 of the Provisional Government in Peiping and the  
10 Restoration Government in Nanking to be embraced into  
11 the National Government; and that Chiang Kai-shek  
12 temporarily leave the scene, etc. That the Japanese  
13 would acquire Chinese territory or monopolize Chinese  
14 interests, etc., were not included.

15           "15. I came back to Tokyo around the end  
16 of August 1938 and reported the above to War  
17 Minister ITAGAKI and the Vice Chief of the General  
18 Staff TADA. I was given approval to negotiate with  
19 the above as the basis.

20           "16. I went to Hong Kong during September  
21 of the same year and when I reported this to Hsieh he  
22 also agreed with me. I decided on Fu-Chow of Fuchien  
23 Province as the site for negotiations and was about  
24 to begin the negotiations when Hankow fell in October  
25 of the same year and was not able to realize it.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

WACHI

DIRECT

1 "17. Even after this I continued negotiations  
2 actively through Sheng's son, Chang Li-luan, and other  
3 prominent men endeavoring to get relations between  
4 Japan and China back to its natural form. I know  
5 that there were a great many men besides me who  
6 exerted themselves in this effort also."

7 You may take the witness.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Tavenner.

9 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, the  
10 testimony, former testimony, of this witness in chief  
11 and on cross-examination begins in the record at  
12 page 19,664. I merely make reference to it in order  
13 to indicate that there are matters in the cross-  
14 examination which effect the credibility of the witness.

15 THE PRESIDENT: That is your statement. We  
16 may think otherwise.

17 MR. TAVENNER: Yes, sir. There will be no  
18 cross-examination.

19 MR. LEVIN: I desire to state, Mr. President,  
20 that the evidence of the witness, whether presented  
21 at this time or before, no doubt will be considered  
22 by the Court, but, except as the evidence has been  
23 challenged or has been discredited, whatever evidence  
24 he has given and concerning which he hasn't been  
25 cross-examined stands as a verity in our judgment.



WACHI

1 THE PRESIDENT: Absence of cross-examination  
2 is not necessarily conclusive of truth, although it  
3 is a serious consideration, in the absence of any  
4 satisfactory explanation. I have a couple of  
5 questions to ask on behalf of Members of the Tribunal.

6 The first: On page 5 you quoted a report.  
7 Where is that report as a whole now?

8 THE WITNESS: That report is in my memory.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Here is another question  
10 bearing on the same matter, I think: Was the report  
11 a written one?

12 THE WITNESS: At the time the report was made  
13 it was in writing. I made the report in writing.  
14 However, that writing does not now exist.

15 THE PRESIDENT: That is all.

16 Mr. Tavenner.

17 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please, in  
18 regard to the matter of cross-examination, we have  
19 given considerable thought to the matter of the extent  
20 to which we should cross-examine. There are many  
21 instances in which we desire to rely upon the prose-  
22 cution's evidence rather than to attempt to show  
23 contradictions between the witness and the prosecution's  
24 evidence. If there were only a few witnesses to  
25 consider we would probably test a great many statements

WACHI

1 in each affidavit with the prosecution's evidence, but  
2 we have felt on the whole that we should restrict  
3 the cross-examination due, principally, to the ques-  
4 tion of time involved and we trust that the Tribunal  
5 will not interpret our failure to cross-examine in  
6 a given instance as an acknowledgement on the part  
7 of the prosecution of the verity of the matters con-  
8 tained in the affidavit.

9 THE PRESIDENT: When you don't cross-examine  
10 it is just as well to give your reasons for not doing  
11 so.

12 MR. TAVENNER: Yes, sir.

13 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, we believe, however,  
14 that no implication can be made from the fact that,  
15 as against these defendants or against the credibility  
16 of the evidence given by a witness, by the mere fact  
17 that the prosecution states that they might be able  
18 to challenge the evidence given by the witness.

19 THE PRESIDENT: A Member of the Court ex-  
20 presses his view this way: "The eliciting of facts  
21 is more important than the saving of time."

22 Yes, Mr. Levin.

23 MR. LEVIN: We now offer in evidence --

24 THE PRESIDENT: The witness is discharged  
25 on the usual terms.

1 MR. LEVIN: May the witness be excused on  
2 the usual terms, Mr. President?

3 THE PRESIDENT: I understand he goes back  
4 to Sugamo. That will be one of the terms.

5 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)  
6

7 MR. LEVIN: We now offer in evidence  
8 defense document No. 1067, an excerpt from The  
9 Weekly News compiled by the Information Bureau, in  
10 regard to despatch of troops to North China.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Nolan.

12 BRIGADIER NOLAN: May it please the Tribunal,  
13 we object to this press release on the grounds that  
14 we objected to defense document 985 which was re-  
15 jected by this Tribunal yesterday.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Is there any difference,  
17 Mr. Levin?

18 MR. LEVIN: I would like to call the  
19 attention -- While this is an excerpt which appeared  
20 in The Weekly News it ~~was~~ compiled by the Information  
21 Bureau and is an official document. I desire to  
22 call the attention of the Court that exhibit No. 952,  
23 tendered by the prosecution, was a press release  
24 issued by the Department of State on August 23, 1937.  
25 Over the strenuous objection of Mr. Logan the Court



1 admitted exhibit 266, page 2543 of the record,  
2 prosecution document No. 1504(D). It was an excerpt  
3 from the Tokyo Gazette, although the prosecution was  
4 not able to indicate that Marquis KIDO published it,  
5 wrote the article, or had anything to do with it.  
6 You said, Mr. President, "From such a number of  
7 articles a hostile inference might be drawn, but perhaps  
8 not from one article."  
9  
0  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 admitted exhibit 266, page 2543 of the record,  
2 prosecution document No. 1504D, it was an excerpt  
3 from the Tokyo Gazette, although the prosecution was  
4 not able to indicate that Marquis KIDO published it,  
5 wrote the article, or had anything to do with it.  
6 You said, Mr. President, "From such a number of articles  
7 a hostile inference might be drawn, but perhaps not  
8 from one article."

G  
r  
e  
e  
n  
b  
e  
r  
g  
&  
B  
a  
r  
t  
o  
n

1           THE PRESIDENT: There again I had in mind  
2 admissions from enemy sources, declarations against  
3 interest, which are always different, as I pointed  
4 cut yesterday. What you say against yourself is  
5 generally admissible; what you say in your own favor  
6 is not, if it is a declaration after an event. That,  
7 of course, is a technical rule of evidence but sound-  
8 ly based on probative value which is a test here.

9           MR. LEVIN: It would seem to us that the  
10 document in question has probative value. It was  
11 prepared by official sources shortly after the inci-  
12 dent occurred from data which they had in their  
13 possession.

14           Mr. Tavenner introduced document No. 1503  
15 which was an excerpt from an official statement of  
16 the Bureau of Information, Department of Foreign  
17 Affairs, entitled "A Japanese, German and Italian  
18 Agreement Against the Communist Internationale."  
19 Those were not captured documents, if it please the  
20 Tribunal; those were publications that were issued  
21 to the world.

22           The Court admitted exhibits No. 610A and  
23 611 which were articles which appeared in the Chicago  
24 Tribune, a report of Mr. John Goette on the situation  
25 in China.



1 As evidence against these accused and on  
2 the issues involved, the Court permitted the report  
3 of the circumstances of the wreck of the steamer  
4 "Krechets," belonging to the State Sea-Shipping Agency,  
5 in the harbor of Hong Kong; and exhibit No. 819, the  
6 report on the firing and plundering in the harbor of  
7 Hong Kong by the Japanese troops of the ship "Svirs-  
8 troy."

9 THE PRESIDENT: The position is put by a  
10 Member of the Tribunal this way: These documents  
11 contain what purports to be a complete justification  
12 of the Japanese actions. If accepted, the accused  
13 need offer no other evidence on the topics with which  
14 they deal. By a majority, the Tribunal upholds the  
15 objection and rejects the document.

16 MR. LEVIN: Next we offer in evidence defense  
17 document No. 1144 -- I am reversing it, 1144 first --  
18 which is a note of the representatives of France,  
19 Germany, England, Italy and Japan, dated July 15,  
20 1902, relative to the return of Tientsin to Chinese  
21 authorities.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

23 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No. 1144  
24 will receive exhibit No. 2483.

25 (Whereupon, the document above re-

ferred to was marked defense exhibit No.  
2483 and received in evidence.)

MR. LEVIN: (Reading).

1 "This document is the Note of the Repre-  
2 sentatives of the five Powers, France, Germany,  
3 England, Italy, addressed to Prince Chi'ing,  
4 Chinese Plenipotentiary, under date of July 15,  
5 1902, taken from the 'Treaties and Agreements with  
6 and concerning China, 1894-1919', compiled and edited  
7 by MacMurray, edition of 1921, pp. 278-284.  
8

9 "In connection with the handing back to  
10 the Chinese authorities of the administration of  
11 Tientsin (as to which see For. Rel. of the U. S.,  
12 1902, pp. 184-201), the representatives of the five  
13 Powers maintaining the provisional government of  
14 that port (namely, France, Germany, Great Britain,  
15 Italy and Japan) addressed to the Chinese Government  
16 under date of July 15, 1902, identical notes of the  
17 following tenor:

18 "I have the honor to acknowledge the re-  
19 ceipt of your Highness' note of the 5th instant,  
20 inclosing copy of a letter from his excellency, the  
21 Viceroy Yuan, urging reasons why the administration  
22 of the city of Tientsin should be handed back to his  
23 excellency at an early date.

24 "In reply I have the honor to state to  
25 Your Highness that, in accord with my colleagues



1 representing powers that still have delegates on  
2 the council of the Tientsin provisional government,  
3 I am authorized by my Government to consent to the  
4 dissolution of that body, provided that the Chinese  
5 Government signifies its adherence to the following  
6 propositions:

7 "By Article VIII of the final protocol of  
8 September 7, 1901, it was declared that the Chinese  
9 Government agreed to have the forts at Taku and  
10 others which might interfere with free communica-  
11 tions between Peking and the sea, demolished; and  
12 it was added that arrangements had been made for  
13 this purpose.

14 "The Chinese plenipotentiaries having ex-  
15 pressed to the diplomatic body their desire to be  
16 relieved of the direct responsibility for carrying  
17 out this Article, the representatives of the signa-  
18 tory powers intrusted the work to the Tientsin pro-  
19 visional government. It is not yet entirely com-  
20 pleted. In order, therefore, to insure the ful-  
21 fillment of this Article, I have the honor to propose  
22 to Your Highness that the work of demolition shall,  
23 from the moment of the dissolution of the Tientsin  
24 provisional government, be placed in the hands of  
25 the G.O.C's at Tientsin, the necessary funds being

1 representing powers that still have delegates on  
2 the council of the Tientsin provisional government,  
3 I am authorized by my Government to consent to the  
4 dissolution of that body, provided that the Chinese  
5 Government signifies its adherence to the following  
6 propositions:

7 "By Article VIII of the final protocol of  
8 September 7, 1901, it was declared that the Chinese  
9 Government agreed to have the forts at Taku and  
10 others which might interfere with free communica-  
11 tions between Peking and the sea, demolished; and  
12 it was added that arrangements had been made for  
13 this purpose.

14 "The Chinese plenipotentiaries having ex-  
15 pressed to the diplomatic body their desire to be  
16 relieved of the direct responsibility for carrying  
17 out this article, the representatives of the signa-  
18 tory powers intrusted the work to the Tientsin pro-  
19 visional government. It is not yet entirely com-  
20 pleted. In order, therefore, to insure the ful-  
21 fillment of this article, I have the honor to propose  
22 to Your Highness that the work of demolition shall,  
23 from the moment of the dissolution of the Tientsin  
24 provisional government, be placed in the hands of  
25 the G.O.C's at Tientsin, the necessary funds being



1 provided out of the moneys then remaining in the  
2 treasury of the Tientsin provisional government.

3 "By Article IX of the same protocol it  
4 is provided that the powers shall have the right  
5 of occupying certain points between Peking and the  
6 sea, of which the whole town of Tientsin is one.  
7 Consequently, after the dissolution of the Tientsin  
8 provisional government, foreign troops will con-  
9 tinue, as hitherto, to be stationed there, in the  
10 places actually occupied by them, their supplies  
11 of all sorts continuing as at present to be exempt  
12 from all taxes or dues whatsoever. They will have  
13 the right of carrying on field exercises and rifle  
14 practice, etc., without informing the Chinese Au-  
15 thorities except in the case of *feux de guerre*.

16 "It is desirable, however, to avoid as  
17 far as possible occasions of collision between the  
18 foreign troops and those of China. I propose, there-  
19 fore, that with this object the Chinese Government  
20 shall undertake not to station or march any troops  
21 within 20 Chinese li (6 2/3 English miles) of the  
22 city or of troops stationed at Tientsin; further,  
23 in correspondence exchanged between the foreign  
24 representatives and the Chinese plenipotentiaries,  
25 of whom Your Highness was one, previous to the sig-



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

The first of the three parts of the  
document is a statement of the  
facts of the case. It is a  
statement of the facts of the case  
as they are known to the  
author. It is a statement of the  
facts of the case as they are  
known to the author. It is a  
statement of the facts of the case  
as they are known to the author.  
The second part of the document  
is a statement of the law. It is  
a statement of the law as it  
applies to the facts of the case.  
It is a statement of the law as  
it applies to the facts of the case.  
The third part of the document  
is a statement of the conclusion.  
It is a statement of the conclusion  
as it applies to the facts of the  
case. It is a statement of the  
conclusion as it applies to the  
facts of the case.

1 nature of the protocol, it was agreed that the  
2 jurisdiction of the commanders of the posts to be  
3 established along the line of communications should  
4 extend to a distance of 2 miles on either side of  
5 the railway, and this arrangement ought to be main-  
6 tained as long as the line of posts specified in  
7 Article IX of the protocol continue to be occupied.

8 "I am willing, however, in concert with  
9 my colleagues, to consent that the Viceroy should  
10 have the right of maintaining a personal bodyguard  
11 in the city of Tientsin not exceeding in number  
12 300 men; and also that His Excellency may maintain  
13 an efficient body of river police along the river,  
14 even where it runs within the 2-mile limit above  
15 mentioned.

16 "The demolition of the forts implies an  
17 obligation upon China not to reconstruct them, and  
18 the same obligation applies to the walls of Tientsin  
19 city, which, during the troubles of 1900, were made  
20 use of as a fortification directed against the se-  
21 curity of the foreign settlements. We can not,  
22 however, consent that the Chinese Government es-  
23 tablish maritime defenses at the mouth of the  
24 Peiho at Chingwangtao or at Shanhaikuan."

25 I omit the next three paragraphs, if the

1 nature of the protocol, it was agreed that the  
2 jurisdiction of the commanders of the posts to be  
3 established along the line of communications should  
4 extend to a distance of 2 miles on either side of  
5 the railway, and this arrangement ought to be main-  
6 tained as long as the line of posts specified in  
7 Article IX of the protocol continue to be occupied.

8 "I am willing, however, in concert with  
9 my colleagues, to consent that the Viceroy should  
10 have the right of maintaining a personal bodyguard  
11 in the city of Tientsin not exceeding in number  
12 300 men; and also that his excellency may maintain  
13 an efficient body of river police along the river,  
14 even where it runs within the 2-mile limit above  
15 mentioned.

16 "The demolition of the forts implies an  
17 obligation upon China not to reconstruct them, and  
18 the same obligation applies to the walls of Tientsin  
19 city, which, during the troubles of 1900 were made  
20 use of as a fortification directed against the se-  
21 curity of the foreign settlements. We can not,  
22 however, consent that the Chinese Government es-  
23 tablish maritime defenses at the mouth of  
24 the Peiho at Chingwangtao or at Shanhaikuan."  
25

I omit the next three paragraphs, if the



1 Tribunal please, and read the fourth paragraph,  
2 which is as follows:

3 "The right of foreign troops to occupy  
4 surron quarters when necessary ought, in my opinion,  
5 to be recognized.

6 "The archives of the Tientsin provisional  
7 government, I consider, should be intrusted to the  
8 senior consul, and application can be made to him  
9 by any person entitled to consult them.

10 "As regards taxation, I consider that the  
11 inhabitants of the city and district should be re-  
12 garded as having discharged their duty to the  
13 Chinese Government during the period of the con-  
14 tinuence of the administration of the Tientsin  
15 provisional government and that no arrears ought  
16 to be demanded of them under this heading'".

17 I shall omit the reading of the balance  
18 of this document.  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1           We next offer in evidence defense document  
2       No. 1143.

3           THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

4           CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No.  
5       1143 will receive exhibit No. 2484.

6                       (Whereupon, the document above re-  
7       ferred to was marked defense exhibit No.  
8       2484 and received in evidence.)

9           MR. LEVIN: This is a note of acceptance of  
10       the terms of the dissolution of the Provisional Govern-  
11       ment of Tientsin, dated July 18, 1902. I believe I  
12       shall omit the heading because that sets forth prac-  
13       tically what the document is.

14                       "The understanding upon which the terms of  
15       this note (the note on the dissolution of the Provi-  
16       sional Government of Tientsin) were accepted by the  
17       Chinese Government was communicated to the American  
18       Minister in a note from Prince Ch'ing under date of  
19       July 18, 1902, of which the substance is (in trans-  
20       lation) as follows:

21                       "10n the 10th of the sixth month, twenty-  
22       eighth year of Kuang-hsu (July 14, 1902), I received  
23       a dispatch from certain ministers of the treaty pow-  
24       ers, stating that in regard to the transfer of the  
25       city of Tientsin and the country adjacent to the

1 jurisdiction of the Viceroy of Chihli, these foreign  
2 ministers had agreed (of the same opinion). They also  
3 had had the honor of receiving the sanction of their  
4 respective governments for the abrogation of the pro-  
5 visional government, provided only that the Chinese  
6 Government should, first of all, distinctly consent  
7 to the conditions proposed, when they, on their part,  
8 would promise that in four weeks from the day on which  
9 consent was given, the provisional government of  
10 Tientsin should be abrogated. They, therefore, re-  
11 quest that it be clearly pointed out to whom, when  
12 the time arrives, and into whose hands the provision-  
13 al government should transfer Tientsin city and the  
14 country adjacent.

15 "I have carefully perused the dispatch with  
16 regard to the point that military posts should be  
17 established along the highway or line of communica-  
18 tion from Peking to the sea, with powers to control  
19 and punish, the distance to extend as far as two  
20 English miles on each side of the railroad,

21 "I would remark that according to the doyen,  
22 His Excellency Cologan's dispatch of the sixth moon,  
23 twenty-seventh year of Kuang-hsu (July, 1901), mili-  
24 tary control would only refer to offences against" --  
25 I presume that is "against." The type is not very



1 clear here -- "the railroad, the telegraph lines, or  
2 against the allied" -- I can't make out that word.

3 THE PRESIDENT: That is "arrives," but it  
4 cannot be the word intended. It may be "allied  
5 armies and."

6 MR. LEVIN (Reading) -- "allied armies and  
7 their property.

8 "As to the remaining articles, I have no  
9 objection to make.

10 "On the 13th of the current month (July 17)  
11 I memorialized the Throne on the subject and had the  
12 honor of receiving the sanction of the Throne by  
13 Imperial decree.

14 "Whereupon, I at once sent replies to the  
15 ministers of the treaty powers, in order that they  
16 might transmit the same to the provisional govern-  
17 ment of Tientsin, that the provisional government be  
18 abolished within four weeks, and the city of Tientsin  
19 and its adjacent country be returned to Chinese ad-  
20 ministration and handed over to the superintendent  
21 of the northern ports, who, as the head of the local  
22 officials, civil and military, will be there to re-  
23 ceive it.

24 "Hereafter, whenever there is need for con-  
25 sultation, the foreign civil and military authorities

1 can, from time to time, consult with his Excellency  
2 the Superintendent of Northern Ports, which, I hope,  
3 will be for the good of the place".

4 (For. Rel. of the U.S., 1902, p. 201)

5 I am advised by my Japanese colleague that  
6 the word that I couldn't read was "armies", as you  
7 stated, Mr. President.

8 We now desire to offer in evidence defense  
9 document No. 956, being resolutions adopted by the  
10 diplomatic body at Peking regarding military occu-  
11 pation of the railway.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

13 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No.  
14 956 will receive exhibit No. 2485.

15 (Whereupon, the document above re-  
16 ferred to was marked defense exhibit No.  
17 2485 and received in evidence.)

18 MR. LEVIN: (Reading).

19 "Resolutions adopted by the Diplomatic  
20 Body at Peking regarding Military Occupation of  
21 the Railway from Peking to Shanhaikuan.

22 "This document is the resolution adopted  
23 by the diplomatic body at Peking at the time of the  
24 Chinese Revolution on January 26, 1912, taken from  
25 the "Treaties and Agreements with and concerning

1 China, 1894-1919," compiled and edited by Mac-  
2 Murray, edition of 1921, PP. 318-319.

3 "During the revolution of 1911-1912 the  
4 representatives of the Powers found it advisable  
5 to exercise the right of military control over the  
6 Peking-Mukden Railway from the capital to Shan-  
7 haikuan, and American, British, French, German,  
8 Italian and Japanese troops accordingly occupied  
9 allotted sections of the railway, between the  
10 points specified, in accordance with the following  
11 resolutions adopted by the Diplomatic Body at  
12 Peking and embodied in its circular No. 13A of  
13 January 26, 1912."

14 The following are the resolutions:

15 "1. That troops should be placed at  
16 important stations, bridges, etc., along the line  
17 of the railway.

18 "2. Both Chinese Imperial and Revolu-  
19 tionist troops are at liberty to utilize the railway  
20 line and adjoining piers and wharves for the purpose  
21 of transportation, landing or embarkation, and will  
22 not be interfered with.

23 "3. Both parties will be notified to  
24 avoid any interference with the railway and to re-  
25 frain from damaging it in any way. The Board of



1 the Imperial Railway of North China will be re-  
2 quested to maintain at both Shanhaikuan and Tientsin  
3 a repair train loaded with suitable materials for  
4 repairing damages.

5 "4. Any attempts to permanently damage  
6 important parts of the line, such as stations, depots,  
7 machinery, bridges, etc., will be resisted by the  
8 combined forces of the six Powers cooperating in  
9 the defense of the railway.

10 "5. The Board of the Imperial Railway  
11 of North China will be requested to always keep  
12 ready at Shanhaikuan and Tientsin sufficient rolling  
13 stock to transport 250 infantry in order that re-  
14 enforcements can rapidly be dispatched.

15 "6. The telegraph offices are to be  
16 protected and telegraphic communications maintained.  
17 Chinese troops of either side may make use of the  
18 line.

19 "7. Officers commanding posts and patrols  
20 should be informed of the conditions laid down in  
21 Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 6, and told to do their best  
22 with the forces at their disposal to carry them out."  
23  
24  
25

1           We now desire to offer in evidence defense  
2 document No. 891, which is a declaration of the Presi-  
3 dent of China relating to respecting of treaties,  
4 agreements and vested rights.

5           THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

6           CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No.  
7 891 will receive exhibit No. 2486.

8           (Whereupon, the document above re-  
9 ferred to was marked defense exhibit No.  
10 2486 and received in evidence.)

11          MR. LEVIN (Reading):

12                       "October 10th, 1913.

13          "I, as President, hereby declare that all  
14 the treaties, agreements and commitments that have  
15 been made between the former government of the Empire  
16 of China as well as the Provisional Government of the  
17 Republic of China and respective foreign governments  
18 shall be infallibly observed, and the legitimate  
19 contracts concluded by the former government with  
20 foreign companies or foreign nationals shall also be  
21 duly observed; moreover, the rights, privileges and  
22 immunities which have already been acquired by foreign  
23 nationals in China according to international agree-  
24 ments, national law, and various established customs  
25 and precedents shall sincerely be recognized, thereby

1 to keep friendship and to maintain peace."

2 We now desire to call the attention of the  
3 Tribunal to defense document No. 489, which has al-  
4 ready been introduced in evidence as exhibit 2434  
5 and which appears at page 19,728 of the record.  
6 It is not intended to read this document again. It  
7 is Foreign Minister HIROTA's speech to the Diet on  
8 22 January 1936 in regard to the policy of Japan  
9 toward China.

10 We desire also to call the attention of the  
11 Tribunal to defense document No. 231, which has al-  
12 ready been introduced in evidence as exhibit 2370  
13 and which appears at page 18,387 of the record. It  
14 is not intended to read this document again. It is  
15 an expression of Minister of Foreign Affairs ARITA  
16 as to the attitude of Japan in relation to various  
17 situations in China.

18 We now offer in evidence defense document  
19 No. 1093, explanation of the Marco Polo Incident  
20 given by a Foreign Office spokesman on July 8, 1937.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Nolan.

22 BRIGADIER NOLAN: We object to this document,  
23 your Honor, for the reasons that we have urged in re-  
24 spect of the other press releases.

25 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, I have nothing



1 to add to the various arguments I have previously  
2 made on the subject.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Can you distinguish this  
4 from the others?

5 MR. LEVIN: I think I can, Mr. President.  
6 This is not a press release. This is an explanation  
7 of the incident as given by the Foreign Office spokes-  
8 man on July 8, 1937.

9 BRIGADIER NOLAN: May it please the Tri-  
10 bunal, this document that is referred to as an offi-  
11 cial document of the Foreign Office, it will be ob-  
12 served, is a document in English in the possession  
13 of the Foreign Office.

14 MR. LEVIN: If the article is admissible in  
15 evidence the mere fact that it is in English would not  
16 make any difference. I would like to suggest another  
17 point, if the Court please, and that is this: This  
18 statement is made on July 8, 1937, which is one day  
19 after the incident occurred. It is almost in the na-  
20 ture of a diary statement, or in the nature of what  
21 would be res gestae. Although, of course, not exactly  
22 parallel, it would seem to use that a statement of  
23 this kind is of the highest probative value.

24 THE PRESIDENT: By a majority, the Court  
25 upholds the objection and rejects the document.

1 MR. LEVIN: We now offer in evidence defense  
2 document No. 1096, which is a statement of the Cabinet  
3 on rights to hold maneuvers in China, dated July 8,  
4 1937.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Nolan.

6 BRIGADIER NOLAN: We object to this docu-  
7 ment as being another press release emanating from a  
8 Foreign Office spokesman. It is no different from  
9 the other documents that have already been rejected.

10 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, the mere fact that  
11 it is a press release does not ipso facto make it the  
12 type of evidence which should not be admitted.

13 THE PRESIDENT: It clearly stands or falls  
14 with the others. The objection is upheld and the  
15 document rejected.

16 MR. LEVIN: I did want to point out, Mr.  
17 President -- I hadn't quite concluded. I accept the  
18 ruling of the Court, but I did want to direct the  
19 attention of the Court to the fact that this is a  
20 statement of the Cabinet on the rights to hold  
21 maneuvers, and it seems to me that that came into a  
22 different category than the others.

23 We now call the witness HASHIMOTO, Gun.  
24  
25

- - -

HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 GUN HASHIMOTO, called as a witness on  
2 behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,  
3 testified through Japanese interpreters as  
4 follows:

5 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen  
6 minutes.

7 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was  
8 taken until 1100, after which the proceed-  
9 ings were resumed as follows:)

10 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
11 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

13 DIRECT EXAMINATION

14 BY MR. LEVIN:

15 Q Will you please state your name, age, and  
16 address?

17 A My name, HASHIMOTO, Gun. My address, Tokyo,  
18 Setagaya-ku, Kitazawa, 4-Chome, No. 464. I was born  
19 in the 19th year of Meiji, October 23; that is, 1877.

20 Q So you are seventy years of age, is that  
21 correct?

22 A According to Japanese reckoning I am sixty-two  
23 years of age.

24 Q There will be handed you defense document  
25 No. 973. Will you please state whether your signature

W  
h  
a  
l  
e  
n  
&  
D  
u  
d  
a



HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

appears thereon?

1 THE INTERPRETER: Correction in the year  
2 in which the witness was born. He was born in 1886.

3 A This is my affidavit.

4 Q Are the contents of the affidavit true and  
5 correct?

6 A There is a mistake. There is one mistake.

7 Q Will you please state what that is and where  
8 it appears?

9 A Fourth line, sixth page of the Japanese text,  
10 paragraph XII.

11 THE INTERPRETER: In the English text the  
12 passage is to be found at the bottom of page 10.

13 A (Continuing) Where it says "...on the same  
14 date" should be corrected to read "...on the night of  
15 the 11th."

16 Q Well, with that correction, is the statement  
17 true and correct?

18 A Yes.

19 MR. LEVIN: I now offer in evidence defense  
20 document No. 973 as corrected, which is the affidavit  
21 of HASHIMOTO, Gun.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

23 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No. 973  
24 will receive exhibit No. 2487.  
25

HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

(Whereupon, the document above  
referred to was marked defense exhibit  
No. 2487 and received in evidence.)

MR. LEVIN: (Reading) "My name is HASHIMOTO,  
Gun. I served as Chief Staff Officer of the China  
Garrison Army from August 1936 to the end of August  
1937. During that period the China Incident broke out.  
I am going to discuss the circumstances of those days.

"1. Concerning the force and disposition of  
the China Garrison Army. There were the following  
units: 1 Infantry Brigade (2 Regiments), 1 cavalry  
company, one artillery regiment (two battalions),  
one engineering company, 1 communication unit, military  
police, hospitals and the Special Service Organ (Pepin,  
Chang-chiakow, Taiyuan, Chinan, Tung-chow). The  
headquarters of the Army was in Tientsin. The head-  
quarters of the Infantry Brigade was in Pepin. The  
headquarters of the 1st Infantry Regiment was in Pepin,  
and the battalions were stationed in Pepin, Fengtai  
and Tientsin. Another small unit was in Tung-chow. As  
for the 2d Infantry Regiment, its headquarters and two  
battalions were stationed in Tientsin, (one battalion  
was in Shanhaikwan, and some units were in Tangku,  
Tang-shan and Chinghuangtao, which are situated along  
the railway line). The cavalry, artillery, and

HASHIMOTO

LIRECT

1 engineering units and the hospitals were in Tientsin.  
2 The headquarters of the military police was in Tientsin  
3 and some of its force were stationed in various other  
4 districts. Besides an officer attached to the  
5 Japanese Embassy was residing in Pepin. He was under  
6 the direct command of the General Staff Office and was  
7 also subject to the command of the commander of the  
8 Army.

9 "The advisers on military affairs had been  
10 dispatched to the 29th Chinese Army. The total force  
11 was about 7,000.

12 "2. Concerning the Duties of the China  
13 Garrison Army.

14 "The China Garrison Army was charged with the  
15 same duties as those of the garrison armies of the  
16 other countries, these duties being based on the  
17 Protocol of the Boxer Incident of 1900. That is to  
18 say, it was charged with the security of communication  
19 lines from diplomatic establishments and Pepin to ports  
20 and harbors and with the protection of the Japanese  
21 residents.

22 "3. Concerning the names of the Commander  
23 and Chief officers of the China Garrison Army at the  
24 time of the outbreak of the Incident.

25 "The commander was originally Lt. General



HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 TASHIRO, Kanichiro, but he fell critically ill several  
2 days prior to the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident  
3 and died on the 9th. Lt. General KOZUKI, Seishi, was  
4 appointed his successor. The commander of the Infantry  
5 Brigade was Major General KAWABE, Shozo; the commander  
6 of the 1st Infantry Regiment, Colonel MUTAGUCHI, Renya;  
7 the Commander of the 2d Regiment, Colonel SUGASHIMA, Ko;  
8 the Commander of the Artillery Regiment, Colonel SUZUKI,  
9 Sotsudo; the Director of the Pepin Special Service Organ  
10 Major General MATSUI, Takuro; and the officer attached  
11 to the Embassy, Major IMAI, Takeo.

12 "4. Concerning the disposition of the Chinese  
13 Army in North China before the outbreak of the Incident.

14 "The 29th Army under the command of Sung  
15 Wen-Lin was disposed in Tientsin, Pepin, Changchiakow,  
16 Paoting and Taming districts (one division was stationed  
17 in each of the above-mentioned district). The army  
18 under the command of Yen Hsi-shan was in Shanhsi  
19 Province, and the army under the command of Han Fu-Chu  
20 was in Shantung Province. The Peace Preservation unit  
21 under the command of Yinju-Keng was in Kihung District.  
22 The Central army was not stationed in North China. As  
23 I remember, exclusive of Shanhsi Province, the Chinese  
24 Army in North China numbered about 300,000.

25 "5. Concerning the nature of Kihung

HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 Anti-Communist Autonomy and the Kihtsa Political  
2 Affairs Committee.

3 "The Kihtung Anti-Communism Autonomy with  
4 Yinju-Keng as its chief, was evidently separated from  
5 the Nanking government and stood for an independent  
6 regime. The outstanding political object of this  
7 regime was the prevention of Communism. The Kihtsa  
8 Political Affairs Committee, with Sungwen-Lin as its  
9 chief, was the local self-governing body recognized by  
10 the Nanking government. Its fundamental principles  
11 had been carried out either by the instructions or  
12 through the counsel of the Nanking government.

13 "6. Concerning the attitude taken toward  
14 China by the China Garrison Army which was instructed  
15 by military authorities in Tokyo.

16 "The China Garrison Army strove tirelessly  
17 for the promotion of economic and cultural cooperation  
18 with Manchukuo and at the same time worked for the  
19 elimination of the threat of Communism, instead of  
20 presenting a political or military threat to China.

21 "When I took up the post of Chief of Staff  
22 Officer of the China Garrison Army, I went to the  
23 military authorities in Tokyo to report my appointment.  
24 In the General Staff Office, as well as in the War  
25 Ministry, I was told to strive for the promotion of

friendly relations with China.

1           "7. Concerning the plan of operation against  
2 China and preparations on the part of the Chinese  
3 Garrison Army before the outbreak of the Incident with  
4 regard to any operation against the Chinese Army.

5           "The military authorities in Tokyo gave no  
6 instructions whatsoever to the China Garrison Army.

7           "As we did not consider waging war with China  
8 at all, we did not work out a plan of operation against  
9 the Chinese Army. However, for the purpose of satis-  
10 factorily discharging the duties of the Garrison Army  
11 in case of emergency, that is, to protect diplomatic  
12 establishments and Japanese residents and to secure  
13 communication lines, various units worked out a gar-  
14 rison plan. This was, so to speak, a plan of passive  
15 defense. Now I shall emphasize the fact that the China  
16 Garrison Army made no preparation for operations  
17 against the Chinese Army.

18           "(a) As stated above the China Garrison Army  
19 had no plans for operations against the Chinese Army,  
20 but the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident did not  
21 warrant optimism. Such being the case, it was not  
22 until 16 July that the China Garrison Army worked out  
23 such plans for operations as to enable the army to be  
24 equal to any emergency. This could not be said to be  
25



1 an over-all plan of operations against the Chinese  
2 Army. It was the plan of operations against only the  
3 29th Army.

4 "(b) The China Garrison Army was no more than  
5 a simple garrison unit without the transport corps and  
6 automobiles essential for the task action of the army.  
7 Therefore, offensive warfare was impossible for this  
8 army.

9 "(c) Such war supplies as arms, ammunition,  
10 provisions, etc., essential for operation were not  
11 provided in full for the army, nor did the army hold  
12 any stock other than a regular supply.

13 "(d) The principal object of the education and  
14 training of the China Garrison Army in peace time was  
15 to form forces as well-equipped and powerful as those  
16 at home. We did not aim at the Chinese forces.

17 "VIII. I will relate here the relationship  
18 between the China Garrison Army and the Kwantung Army.

19 "As a result of the conclusion of the Tangku  
20 Truce Pact between the Kwantung Army and the Chinese  
21 Army, the Kwantung Army had been taking a responsible  
22 part in North China problems. However, in April, 1936,  
23 in accordance with the order of the central authorities,  
24 affairs concerning the truce pact were transferred  
25 from the Kwantung Army to the China Garrison Army,

HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 together with several other matters. Thus, the duties  
2 of both armies were made quite clear. Since then both  
3 armies kept to their respective spheres of duty,  
4 hence no trouble whatever has occurred between these  
5 two armies.

6 "IX. I will describe here feelings between  
7 the Japanese and the Chinese forces and also between  
8 these two nations.

9 "As members of the Japanese Army, we strove,  
10 in accordance with the national policy of friendship  
11 between Japan and China, to convince the Chinese Army  
12 of our desire to strengthen the ties of amity with the  
13 Chinese Army.

14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1           "While the majority of the higher classes of  
2 the Chinese army well realized the necessity of Sino-  
3 Japanese cooperation and made efforts to achieve it,  
4 the lower officers and soldiers did not thoroughly  
5 understand the intentions of their seniors, and anti-  
6 Japanese speech and behavior has never ceased. In  
7 particular after the Suiyuang and the Hsian Incidents,  
8 the underground activity of the Communist Party grew  
9 more intense and, accordingly, there was no gainsaying  
10 the fact that the Chinese army was greatly influenced  
11 by this agitation.

12           "The feelings of the Japanese and the Chinese  
13 people at that time were, to our regret, not conducive  
14 to friendship, in spite of the indispensability of  
15 maintaining friendly relations between the two nations.

16           "Following is an enumeration of some substan-  
17 tial examples:

18           "On September 18, 1936, when the Japanese  
19 and the Chinese forces were on the march at Fengtai  
20 and passed each other on the road, a clash was about  
21 to break out originating from blows assailed by a  
22 Chinese soldier on a draught horse of the Japanese  
23 army. However, this was settled quietly, thanks to  
24 an appropriate measure taken by the leading officers  
25 of both armies.



HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 "Also, military communications between Peipin  
2 and Tientsin were often broken. There were, in addi-  
3 tion, cases of insults to the Japanese flag in some  
4 places.

5 "For example of the pro-Japanese feelings on  
6 the part of higher ranking Chinese officers, even when  
7 trouble had broken out and there were many bloody  
8 incidents at the front, although their emotions were  
9 becoming more and more excited, relations between the  
10 higher ranking men of both armies were as friendly and  
11 calm as usual. Mr. Sung Che-yuan even attended alone  
12 and unguarded the funeral of army commander TASHIRO  
13 held in the Japanese concession on the 16th of July.  
14 He cried bitterly before the spirit of the dead over  
15 losing such a close friend.

16 "X. Concerning the conflict between the  
17 Japanese and Chinese armies at Lukouchiao.

18 "The Lukochiao accident was neither a planned  
19 strategical move nor a challenge on the part of the  
20 Japanese side. The following will prove this fact:

21 "(a) The army commander, TASHIRO, had been  
22 ill in bed one month before the outbreak of the acci-  
23 dent, had been growing worse day by day, and had finally  
24 died on July 9. If there had been any planned con-  
25 spiracy on the Japanese side, it would have been better

1 to change the army commander at once.

2       "(b) Brigade Commander KAWABE, the most  
3 responsible man, was not on the scene on the day of  
4 the accident, having gone to Shanhaikuan for an in-  
5 spection.

6       "(c) On the day of the incident the troops  
7 in Peipin had gone to Tung-chow for maneuvers and only  
8 one company of troops was left in Peipin. This was  
9 not enough to indicate that the incident had been  
10 planned.

11       "(d) A battalion out of the infantry regi-  
12 ment in Tientsin was also dispatched to Shanhaikuan  
13 for maneuvers.

14       "(e) Since the unit which was holding maneu-  
15 vers at Lukouchiao had no live shells, and consequently  
16 could not return fire when shot at by the Chinese,  
17 they, therefore, retreated from the place to Mt. Ichi-  
18 monji for refuge.

19       "(f) The place where the company was holding  
20 maneuvers was strategically a very disadvantageous  
21 lowland surrounded by Yuanping and Lungwangmiao where  
22 the Chinese garrisons were located. Under such disad-  
23 vantageous circumstances, it would have been very dan-  
24 gerous for the Japanese to initiate a disturbance.

25       "The objective circumstances were very

HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 disadvantageous, rather dangerous, for the Japanese  
2 side as I have said above. It was impossible for the  
3 Japanese army to challenge the Chinese army under such  
4 conditions.

5 "XI. Concerning the maneuvers and the loca-  
6 tion of maneuvers of the Japanese army.

7 "The stationary troops in the North China of  
8 the countries had had their own maneuvering grounds  
9 under an agreement with the Chinese side in accordance  
10 with the protocol of the Boxer Uprising of 1900  
11 (Meiji 33). Also, in accordance with an agreement  
12 with the Chinese, the Peipin troops had grounds in  
13 Tung-chow, and the Fengtai troops had both a parade  
14 ground at the north side of the barracks and maneuver  
15 grounds on a plain, three kilometres west of the bar-  
16 racks. The stationary troops in Tientsin or other  
17 places also had maneuver grounds. This was the case  
18 not only of the Japanese army but also of the troops  
19 of other countries.

20 "It is true, as Witness Chin Te-chun said,  
21 that the Japanese army carried out their maneuvers  
22 without any notice to the Chinese side. However,  
23 there was no obligation to give such notice. The pro-  
24 tocol had given the troops of foreign countries the  
25 right to maneuver without notice. But in May of 1937,



1 the Chinese side wanted to be informed about night  
2 maneuvers, since they excited people and caused social  
3 uneasiness. If notified, Chinese authorities could  
4 forecast maneuvers to the people and relieve anxiety.  
5 We agreed to this request and decided to give notice of  
6 night maneuvers beforehand. As for the night maneuvers  
7 of July 7, as I found out after the incident had ended  
8 by inquiring through the special service agency, that  
9 it was clear that the Chinese had been notified.

10 "XII. Concerning the measures taken by the  
11 Japanese army after they had learned about the Lukou-  
12 chiao accident.

13 "The military authorities approved the first  
14 report from the front that a committee of Japanese and  
15 Chinese would investigate actual conditions.

16 "On July 8, in the morning, they heard  
17 from the front that the ICHIKI Battalion had attacked  
18 the Chinese army in Lungwangmiao. The authorities  
19 stopped action at the front at once and ordered the  
20 battalion to wait for the further instructions.

21 "The military authorities held a staff confer-  
22 ence and determined to settle the problem without allow-  
23 ing it to spread any more. They issued orders to their  
24 units in accordance with this decision, telegraphed the  
25 decision to central headquarters, and awaited orders.

HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 At the same time, they took steps to get Brigade  
2 Commander KAWABE back to Peipin. When he passed  
3 Tientsin, I instructed him by telephone to put a stop  
4 to actions at the front according to the policy and to  
5 settle the trouble on the spot. In order to avoid  
6 misunderstandings of the policy of the military author-  
7 ities, I also dispatched a staff there.

8 "On July 8, at 6 P.M., the general staff, by  
9 telegram, ordered adherence to the non-spreading policy,  
10 and especially the avoidance of the use of force to  
11 prevent the spreading of the incident.

12 "The military authorities made a plan for  
13 settling the problem at the actual place and delivered  
14 it to headquarters. Then I went to Peipin and showed  
15 the plan to the Chinese authorities, who agreed to it  
16 and signed it on the 9th, was that? "The main  
17 points are as follows:

18 "(s) The representatives of the 29th Army  
19 will proclaim their responsibility for the incident,  
20 express their regret to the Japanese, and punish the  
21 responsible people.

22 "(b) Since the Chinese army is too near to  
23 the Japanese army in Fengtai and incidents are apt to  
24 occur, there will henceforth be no troops in Lukouchiao  
25 and Lungwangmiao, and a Peace Preservation Corps will

HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 maintain security.

2       "(c) As this incident was mainly led by the  
3 'Blue Shirts Society' and other Communist or anti-  
4 Japanese associations, the Chinese authorities will  
5 consider a counter-plan to control them thoroughly.  
6 Thus, the treaty was signed and sealed, but the Japan-  
7 ese authorities did not soon carry out the treaty's  
8 promises.

9       "Observing conditions, the headquarters in-  
10 structed the Army as follows.

11       "The following are the basic principles in-  
12 volved in settling the situation:"

13       I think I misread a word under (c) where it  
14 said, "Thus, the treaty was signed and sealed, but the  
15 Chinese authorities did not soon carry out the treaty's  
16 promises." Reading (A).

17       "(A) To request at least the following points  
18 to be performed on the 19th of July.

19       "(1) Sung Che-yuan shall express his regret  
20 formally.

21       "(2) Punishments of the responsible are to  
22 extend to the dismissal of Feng Yeh-an.

23       "(3) Troops in Papaoshan shall retreat from  
24 that point.

25       "(4) Sung Che-yuan shall sign the conditions



HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 of the settlement presented on the 10th of July.

2       "(B) If the Chinese Army does not perform  
3 these request of ours in the period allowed, our Army  
4 will stop negotiations on the spot, and the Japanese  
5 Army will punish the 29th Army. In order to do that,  
6 the Japanese authorities will mobilize troops at home  
7 at the end of the time limit and dispatch them to  
8 North China at once.

9       "(C) After the time limit, even if the Chinese  
10 side does not yield and agree to perform our requests,  
11 the 29th Army is to retreat to the right bank of the  
12 River Yungting.

13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

Y  
e  
l  
d  
e  
n  
&  
S  
p  
r  
a  
t  
t

1 "D) Since Japan wants to limit the situa-  
2 tion to North China and settle the trouble on the  
3 scene, we request the Nanking Government to restore  
4 the Central Army to its former state, to stop the  
5 challenging actions against Japan, and not to inter-  
6 fere with settlement at the actual scene. Thence,  
7 we sent the above instructions to the Chinese  
8 authorities. Sung Che-yuan accepted them, came  
9 to Tientsin himself on July 18, expressed his regret  
10 to the Army Commander, and presented the provisions  
11 for the control of the Communist and other anti-  
12 Japanese associations mentioned in the above agree-  
13 ment.

14 "Thus, the Chinese side, though they  
15 accepted our offer, failed just as before to try to  
16 carry out its terms. Especially, they delayed the  
17 carrying out of the items of the agreement concern-  
18 ing the Chinese Army's evacuation. To the contrary,  
19 disgraceful affairs came out one after another in  
20 various places, and we did not find them at all  
21 sincere.

22 "13. I shall speak about the disgraceful  
23 affairs during the confrontation of both sides.

24 "On July 11: On Marco Polo Bridge the  
25 Chinese Army fired at us illegally and we had ten

HOSHIMOTO

DIRECT

casualties (six of them killed).

"On July 13: The Chinese Army fired unlawfully at Japanese Army Troops passing Nanyuan and Hotzun, and we had ten casualties (five of them killed).

"On July 16: The Japanese Army, while passing by the vicinity of Anping, was fired upon by the Chinese Army. Fortunately, there were no casualties.

"On July 20: On I Wentzu-Shan, the Chinese Army fired unlawfully at Japanese Army Troops and we had four casualties (one of them killed).

"On July 25: The Chinese Army fired unlawfully at Japanese soldiers who were repairing the communication line at Langfeng. There were fifteen casualties on the Japanese side (four of them killed).

"To prevent the occurrence of such an untoward incident, we had given them advance notice of the repair work and had begun to work. The attack was, therefore, malicious.

"On July 26: The Kwangan-gate Incident occurred. In this case also, we gave them advance notice, and with their consent, one of our battalions passed through the Kwangan gate in order to return to the camp in the Castle of Peking for the purpose of



HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 protecting our residents. On the way, the Chinese  
2 Army shut the door of the walled city and attacked  
3 the Japanese soldiers who had already entered. This  
4 was a most malicious attack. We suffered seventeen  
5 casualties (two of them killed, and, in addition, two  
6 journalists killed.)

7 "14. Concerning the military action of  
8 mobilization and massing of the Japanese Army after  
9 the occurrence of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.  
10 In the morning, on July 8, our stationary army in  
11 China decided not to allow the incident to spread  
12 and at the same time not to request for an increase  
13 in the Kwantung Army, but to mass the main power  
14 of the stationary army around Fengtai and Tanchou  
15 for the worst. This was arranged to prevent ex-  
16 pansion of the incident. Nevertheless, on July 10,  
17 in the Central Headquarters of the Chinese Army,  
18 mobilization of the air force was ordered, and four  
19 divisions were commanded to gather at the north line  
20 of the Honan province.

21 "On July 12, it was ordered to mobilize the  
22 units in the province of Honan, Hopei, Anhwei and  
23 Kiangsu, and to mass them along the Lunghai railway  
24 and the Peiping-Hankow railway.

25 "On July 14, Canton air force and army were

1 dispatched. Thus the Chinese showed a tendency  
2 toward advancing north; therefore, the position of  
3 our stationary army became dangerous. Headquarters  
4 in Tokyo put the 20th Battalion of Korea as well  
5 as the mixed brigade of the Kwantung Army, a  
6 mechanized brigade, some air units and other  
7 auxiliary units under command of the commander in  
8 chief of the stationary army in China. These units  
9 came to north China in succession after about  
10 July 12. Then Central Headquarters massed the 20th  
11 Army in the district of Tangshen and Shankaikwan  
12 (after that one part advanced to Tientsin); units  
13 of Kwantung Army, in the vicinity of Shuni, north  
14 of Peking; the main forces of the regular stationary  
15 army, in Fengtai; and a part of the same army in  
16 Tunchow.

17 "Afterwards negotiations with the Chinese  
18 were continued.

19 "After the stationary army in China came to  
20 take decisive steps other divisions in Japan proper  
21 were mobilized. Specifically on July 27 three  
22 divisions were ordered to mobilize. On the 29th the  
23 mobilization was completed and they were transported  
24 to north China in succession. It was on August 15  
25 that the first of these divisions arrived in North

1 China.

2 "15. Concerning the motives of our  
3 stationary army for deciding the systematic attack  
4 against Nanyuan and the actual beginning of hos-  
5 tilities.

6 "After the malicious, disgraceful incidents  
7 at Langfang, Kwangan-gate, etc., had broken out in  
8 succession, more serious incidents might occur and  
9 dangerous consequence might fall upon us if the  
10 Japanese side remained patient any longer. In view  
11 of that possibility, we decided it proper to punish  
12 the Chinese in order to protect our right and to  
13 force the 29th army to reconsider its actions. We  
14 thus determined to attack, but we did not attack  
15 without warning.

16 "On July 25, as soon as the Langfang  
17 Incident broke out, we sent notification asking  
18 the Chinese side to reconsider. Again, on the  
19 26th, when we met with the Kwangan-gate Incident,  
20 we sent an ultimatum, leaving room for reconsidera-  
21 tion, but we received no answer to that. Thereupon,  
22 on the 28th we carried out the attack against Nanyuan.  
23 Notification sent after the Langfang Incident were  
24 as follows:

25 "It is regrettable that both our forces



HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 have come into collision at last, forced by un-  
2 lawful fixing on the part of your forces against  
3 a part of the Japanese forces, which had been  
4 dispatched to protect communication lines at  
5 Langfang on the night of the 25th.

6 "Such a situation has been caused by  
7 your lack of sincerity in enforcing the conditions  
8 agreed upon with our forces and by your continued  
9 belligerent attitude. If your forces wish to keep  
10 this outbreak from spreading you first immediately  
11 order the troops near the Marco Polo Bridge and  
12 Papaoshan to retreat to Changsintien by tomorrow  
13 noon and that part of the 37th division in Peiping  
14 to move from the walled city of Peiping to the  
15 western district of Yungting River by noon of the  
16 28th through the northern districts of the Peiping-  
17 Hankow Railways. They must be accompanied by the  
18 troops of the 37th division who are in Hsivnan.  
19 Thereafter you must begin the gradual transporta-  
20 tion of these troops toward Paoting.

21 "If your forces do not act upon our  
22 advice, we shall consider your forces as lacking  
23 in sincerity, and we shall, therefore, be forced  
24 to take suitable action. In that event your forces  
25 will be charged with responsibility for anything

HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 that occurs.'

2 "I cannot relate the note which was issued  
3 after the Kwanganmen Incident, since I have no  
4 record, but I remember that, by and large, they  
5 urged a reply to the above related note within a  
6 time limit.

7 "This resolution to wage war was not  
8 directed against China as a whole, but against  
9 only the 37th division, which was the most  
10 characteristically anti-Japanese of the units in  
11 the 29th Army. This was simply because of the  
12 fact that the army had truly intended to limit its  
13 activities even when operations were started.  
14 Especially, since the withdrawal of the 37th  
15 division had been demanded as shown in the afore-  
16 said notification, it was but natural for the  
17 Japanese army to conclude that she had a right  
18 to leave other divisions at Tientsin and in the  
19 neighborhood of Peking. This determination of the  
20 army was reported to the Central Headquarters. The  
21 Central Headquarters agreed to this and issued an  
22 order for the commencement of a movement.

23  
24 "In the order, however, there was a clause  
25 which instructed the army 'not to go beyond the  
line along the river Yungting-ho.' By this clause

1 the army understood that the Central Headquarters  
2 had not abandoned the hope of settling the question  
3 at the spot.

4 "16. I should now like to tell the reasons  
5 for the nonexpansion policy of the army and also to  
6 discuss the attitude of the Central Headquarters.

7 "The reasons for which the army had taken  
8 the non-expansion policy might be stated briefly as  
9 follows: It was considered improper to change the  
10 great policy of the state which had been to bring  
11 about good relations between Japan and China,  
12 simply because of a military conflict at a certain  
13 locality. Moreover, the Japanese Army stationed in  
14 China never thought of going into war with that  
15 country, and, consequently had no preparation for  
16 such a war. Again, we considered that if we opened  
17 war against China, it would grow into a racial con-  
18 flict and that the conflict might be a prolonged war,  
19 due to the vastness of the Chinese territory. So,  
20 we determined to avoid a war with China as long as  
21 possible. Fortunately, the leaders of the Chinese  
22 Army, the other party of our negotiation, also had  
23 a 'nonexpansion' principle, and we believed that we  
24 would be able to reach a peaceful agreement. I have  
25 already mentioned in fragments the fact that various



1 measures were taken by Central Headquarters just  
2 in the same manner to prevent the expansion of the  
3 affair. In particular, Commander KAGETSU, on his  
4 arrival there to assume his new post, gave instruc-  
5 tions to persist in the 'nonexpansion' policy.  
6 Again, Chief of the General Affairs Section of the  
7 General Staff NAKAJIMA and Chief of the Military  
8 Affairs Section of the War Ministry SHIBAYAMA were  
9 sent to the front to obtain full understanding  
10 of the nonexpansion policy of the Central Head-  
11 quarters, on the part of the entire army, at the  
12 front.

13 "17. I shall relate a strange event which  
14 happened while the Japanese and the Chinese forces  
15 were face to face at the front. After the outbreak  
16 of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, there were persons  
17 who often discharged guns from the flank to tempt  
18 the Chinese to open fire illegally which both the  
19 Japanese and the Chinese forces were in a state of  
20 mutual suspense. It was repeated almost every  
21 evening. I heard rumors that it was probably done  
22 by Chinese students or by Communist elements. I  
23 think there existed a third party's intrigue to  
24 provoke a conflict between the Japanese and the  
25 Chinese forces.

HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 "18. I should like to add one thing to  
2 what witness Chin Te-chun has told about the  
3 establishment for the sake of the strengthening  
4 of military power. Mr. Chin Te-chun misunderstood  
5 the facts. One infantry battalion was stationed  
6 in Fengtai. However, our barracks were in railway  
7 property belonging to a railway station, and, since  
8 the area was small and inconvenient for sanitation  
9 as well as for drilling, we asked to borrow some  
10 land in the neighbourhood as a new site for our  
11 barracks. However, the authorities of the Hopei-  
12 Chahar Regime shirked their responsibility under  
13 the pretext that Chinese nationals' opposed the move."

14 THE PRESIDENT: "Nationals," I suppose.

15 MR. LEVIN: What is that?

16 THE PRESIDENT: That should be "nationals,"  
17 I take it.

18 MR. LEVIN: "Nationals opposed the move,"  
19 I presume.

20 MR. LEVIN (Continuing): "Therefore we  
21 asked a few Chinese natives and discovered that  
22 their answer was favorable to us. Accordingly, we  
23 negotiated with the Chinese authorities, but the  
24 authorities ordered the Head of the Yuanping-hsien  
25 to compel the natives to write a document opposing us."

HASHIMOTO

DIRECT

1 "Definite denial was not given to this  
2 request and as time went on the matter was left as  
3 it was. The conversation between Mr. Chin and  
4 myself written in Mr. Chin's oral statement is a  
5 pure fabrication. I met Mr. Sung-Che-yuan once  
6 only to urge him."

7 You may take the witness.  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25



HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 THE PRESIDENT: Judge Nyi.

2 JUDGE NYI: If it pleases this Tribunal, I  
3 shall proceed with the cross-examination.

4 CROSS-EXAMINATION

5 BY JUDGE NYI:

6 Q Mr. Witness, you have mentioned here in your  
7 affidavit the long illness of General TASHIRO. Was  
8 there an acting commander during his illness and  
9 before his successor assumed office?

10 A No.

11 Q Then can I take it that you were virtually  
12 in command of the Garrison Army during that period?

13 A The command continued to be in the hands of  
14 General TASHIRO during his illness.

15 Q But he was so seriously ill, as you say,  
16 and he died right after the incident of Marco Polo?

17 A Until General TASHIRO, Commander of the North  
18 China Army, became extremely, seriously ill he was in  
19 command of his own mind, he was fully conscious, and  
20 from his bed took direct command of the affairs of his  
21 army. However, he became very seriously ill about two  
22 or three days prior to the outbreak of the incident,  
23 whereupon an application was made with the Central Army  
24 Authorities to appoint a successor.

25 Q When did the successor come to assume office?

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1       A    I recall that he came on July 13.

2       Q    At the middle of page 2 of your affidavit  
3 you stated that a China Garrison Army was charged with  
4 the security of communication lines from Peiping to the  
5 sea and with the protection of Japanese residents.  
6 On the top of page 4 you also stated that the China  
7 Garrison strove tirelessly for the promotion of the  
8 economic and cultural cooperation with Manchukuo. That  
9 later statement contains a very unusual assignment of  
10 a political nature for a garrison army. My question  
11 will be:

12           Was it the policy of your government to  
13 guide North China in a way as to realize the unity  
14 and the mutual aid of Japan, Manchukuo and China which  
15 would mean eventually the Chinese recognition of Man-  
16 chukuo?

17           THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

18           MR. LEVIN: I object to the question on the  
19 ground that it is argumentative and embodies two or  
20 three questions in one.

21           THE PRESIDENT: It is far too long, Dr. Nyi.

22           JUDGE NYI: Yes, I will try to correct it.

23           THE PRESIDENT: We are always insisting here  
24 on short, clear questions otherwise we will have diffi-  
25 culty with the translation. Split it up, omitting

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 anything of an argumentative nature.

2 JUDGE NYI: I appreciate your Honor's  
3 direction and I will make it very short. I will  
4 simply ask the witness:

5 Q Was it the policy of the government, the  
6 Japanese government, to guide North China in a way  
7 to realize the unity and mutual aid of Japan, Manchu-  
8 kuo and China so that there will be an eventual  
9 recognition of Manchukuo by China?

10 MR. LEVIN: I object to the question, Mr.  
11 President, on the ground it goes beyond the scope of  
12 the evidence of the witness and there is nothing to  
13 indicate that he could speak for the policy of the  
14 government of Japan.

15 THE PRESIDENT: If I recollect rightly the  
16 witness did purport to state the policy of Japan on  
17 that matter. The objection is overruled.

18 Q Will you please answer my question?

19 A In my affidavit I stated that the original  
20 and basic duty and assignment of the North China  
21 Garrison was to protect the -- was to secure communi-  
22 cation lines and to protect Japanese nationals. The  
23 second passage referred to, that is, the promotion of  
24 Japanese-Manchukuo friendship and good will, that re-  
25 flects the attitude which the North China army should



HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 take in its relationship with North China.

2 THE MONITOR: "North" is omitted. China  
3 Garrison Army in China--through China.

4 A I think the Japanese policy can be deter-  
5 mined on the basis of these two points I just  
6 referred to. That is, as regards the assignment of  
7 the China Garrison, I cannot make any very definite,  
8 positive testimony with regard to the point just  
9 raised by the prosecutor.

10 Q But your attitude is based on some policy,  
11 isn't it?

12 A That policy was the promotion of good will  
13 and amity with China and in accordance with the  
14 policy and aim of the Central Authorities, that is,  
15 the government, to foster especially in North China  
16 amicable, cultural and economic relations in mutual  
17 cooperation with the people of China.

18 Q So finally you admit that there was a policy?

19 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

20 MR. LEVIN: We object to that, Mr. President.  
21 The answer speaks for itself.

22 JUDGE NYI: Your Honor, I made this statement  
23 because the witness in the beginning said that he  
24 couldn't determine whether there was any policy. He  
25 merely referred to it as an attitude.

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 THE PRESIDENT: There is a fine distinction --  
2 you may appreciate it, I do not -- between attitude  
3 and policy. I know they are different words but in  
4 this context probably they mean the same thing.

5 We will recess now until half-past one.

6 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.)  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

## AFTERNOON SESSION

V  
O  
l  
f  
&  
M  
o  
r  
s  
e

1 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at  
2 1330.

3 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
4 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

5 G U N H A S H I M O T O, a witness called on  
6 behalf of the defense, resumed the stand and  
7 testified through Japanese interpreters as  
8 follows:  
9

10 THE PRESIDENT: Judge Nyi.

11 JUDGE NYI: Mr. President, with regard to 20,642  
12 Japan's policy of guiding North China, I wish to  
13 invite the Tribunal's attention to prosecution's  
14 exhibit 219. It appears on page 2748 of the record.  
15 I do not propose to read it in the interest of saving  
16 time.

17 BY JUDGE NYI (Continued):

18 Q Now, Mr. Witness, will you tell us how did  
19 you strive to achieve the object of promoting economic  
20 and cultural cooperation with Manchukuo?

21 A Between Manchukuo and what country?

22 Q Well, in your affidavit you only say that  
23 you wanted to promote cultural and economic cooperation  
24 follows:  
25

THE PRESIDENT: Judge Nyi.

JUDGE NYI: Mr. President, with regard to 20,642

Japan's policy of guiding North China, I wish to  
invite the Tribunal's attention to



HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 with Manchukuo. I don't know which you are referring  
2 to. Probably North China.

3 A I have no recollection as to any special  
4 efforts made with regard to the promotion of economic  
5 matters between North China and Manchukuo.

6 Q Which were you referring to when you state  
7 on page 2 that you strove tirelessly for that objective?

8 A I think I stated in my affidavit that efforts  
9 were made to promote good will between North China and  
10 Japan.

11 Q Well, you didn't say, "Promote good will  
12 between North China and Manchukuo." You stated on  
13 page 4, "of economic and cultural cooperation with  
14 Manchukuo."

15 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, I have just been  
16 advised by one of my Japanese colleagues that the  
17 translation on page 4, although it does have the  
18 word "Manchukuo" is in error and it should be "China,"  
19 and Mr. OKAMOTO is now discussing the matter with  
20 Major Moore. I would like to direct the attention  
21 of the Tribunal to that fact.

22 THE PRESIDENT: We refer it to the Language  
23 Section. Pass on to something else, Judge Nyi.

24 Q Now if it was China that you were referring to  
25 with whom, that you were referring to, would the

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 cooperation be? Between China and whom?

2 A China and Japan.

3 Q Then tell us how you strove tirelessly for  
4 that objective. In what way?

5 A First of all our foremost efforts were made  
6 in the promotion of good will and amicable relations  
7 with various circles in North China.

8 Q Is that all?

9 A With regard to concrete matters, efforts were  
10 made whenever any particular question arose to settle  
11 them in accordance with the spirit of amity.

12 Q Does it include the execution of a propaganda  
13 scheme?

14 A If by propaganda you mean the introduction  
15 of Japan and Japanese affairs in North China, that  
16 was included.

17 Q Does your program include establishment of  
18 secret service agency?

19 A No.

20 Q Does your program include the free importa-  
21 tion of goods from Manchukuo and Japan and you have  
22 the Japanese term for it Tokushu Koeki?

23 THE PRESIDENT: Meaning what?

24 JUDGE NYI: Special trade.

25 A No.

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 THE INTERPRETER: The witness replied it  
2 was not included.

3 Q You mention Manchukuo in your affidavit. Do  
4 you, as a high ranking officer in the Garrison Army,  
5 know that your government desired to utilize the Marco  
6 Polo Bridge Incident to press for Chinese recognition  
7 of Manchukuo?

8 A No.

9 Q Do you know that your government was always  
10 keen in bringing about harmonious collaboration among  
11 Japan, Manchukuo and China?

12 MR. LEVIN: I object to the form of this  
13 question as not within the purview of the affidavit,  
14 if the Court please.

15 THE PRESIDENT: I think it is. It is very  
16 hard to say what is or is not, but the first part of  
17 the affidavit is pretty broad.

18 JUDGE NYI: Could the witness be asked  
19 this question, your Honor?

20 THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question, witness.

21 A May I have the question repeated?

22 Q Did you know that your government was always  
23 keen in bringing about harmonious collaboration among  
24 Japan, Manchukuo and China?

25 A Yes, that is the way I thought.



HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 Q Do you also know that they were anxious to  
2 ask China to recognize Manchukuo?

3 A Yes.

4 Q Now was that the real reason why an agreement  
5 for the cessation of hostilities following the Marco  
6 Polo Bridge could not be reached?

7 A I don't understand the purport of that question.  
8 A truce was agreed upon.

9 Q But do you know that something was going on  
10 between China and Japan that the recognition of Manchukuo  
11 should be one of the conditions to end the hostilities?

12 A I don't think such a thing existed.

13 Q Now on page 9 of your affidavit, the second  
14 paragraph, you mention that your right to station  
15 troops and to hold maneuvers was derived from the  
16 treaties. Do you know that you could only occupy  
17 twelve specific points on the line between Peking and  
18 the sea?

19 A Yes.

20 Q Now where was the Marco Polo Bridge? Was it  
21 situated on that line?

22 A Marco Polo Bridge was outside of that line.

23 Q Do you also know that by treaty stipulations  
24 the right to station troops is limited to a distance  
25 of two miles on both sides of the line from Peking

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 to the sea?

2 A I interpret your word "stationing" as to mean  
3 garrison.

4 Q Yes.

5 A And Japanese troops were not stationed or  
6 garrisoned in that sense at Marco Polo. I think the  
7 problem is with respect to Fengtai.

8 Q Marco Polo Bridge was beyond the two miles  
9 limit. You don't deny that, do you?

10 A Japanese troops were in the vicinity of  
11 Lukouchiao or the Marco Polo Bridge for the purpose  
12 of maneuvers, not for garrison duty or to be stationed  
13 there.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 Q Now, in the last paragraph on page 9 of  
2 your affidavit, about 10 lines from the bottom,  
3 you stated this: "But in May of 1937, the Chinese  
4 side wanted to be informed about night maneuvers,  
5 since they excited people and caused social uneasiness.  
6 If notified, Chinese authorities could forecast  
7 maneuvers to the people and relieve anxiety. We  
8 agreed to this request and decided to give notice  
9 of night maneuvers beforehand."

10 Now, since you knew quite well that these  
11 maneuvers "excited people and caused social uneasiness,"  
12 why did you persist on holding them?

13 A It was a request on the part of the Chinese  
14 that notice be given beforehand of night maneuvers,  
15 because it would tend to excite the people and create  
16 social unrest. That was a Chinese request.

17 We conducted maneuvers as maneuvers were  
18 carried on in Japan proper by day and by night, and,  
19 with regard to the right to hold maneuvers, it was  
20 guaranteed by the basic treaty.

21 Q Now, will you tell us how often did you hold  
22 these maneuvers; how frequently?

23 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

24 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, I submit that that  
25 question is irrelevant and immaterial, because, if they



HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 had a right to hold maneuvers then there is and there  
2 was no limitation as to time. They could hold them  
3 whenever they saw fit.

4 THE PRESIDENT: The question is not irrelevant.  
5 What Mr. Levin suggests may appear later, but it  
6 does not render the question irrelevant. The objection  
7 is overruled.

8 A It was different at times, because that  
9 depended upon the intensity of the training as it  
10 was carried on. Night maneuvers were held most  
11 intensively, in my recollection, between April and  
12 May and September and October -- until September  
13 and October yearly. I cannot say how many times such  
14 maneuvers were carried on, but I can say that they  
15 were held quite frequently.

16 THE PRESIDENT: A colleague who knows says  
17 that soldiers must be continuously trained and the  
18 question is of very little interest.

19 Q Witness, Masakazu KAWABE testified yesterday  
20 on page four of his affidavit that it was conducted  
21 almost every night. Was that right?

22 A Yes, at that time I should think that was  
23 correct. That was right. However, I must add that  
24 maneuvers were carried on every night, but not of the  
25 same troops. Different army units were trained every

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 night in a very confined area.

2 Q Do you suggest that you hold maneuvers  
3 as frequently as every night in Japan too?

4 MR. LEVIN: We object to that as incompetent  
5 and immaterial, if the Court please.

6 THE MONITOR: The witness replied "That is  
7 not so; you are speaking of a different matter."

8 JUDGE NYI: Your Honor, the witness was  
9 just telling us that they were conducting maneuvers  
10 in the same way as they did in Japan, and now he  
11 says that they were conducted differently.

12 THE PRESIDENT: I suppose you are suggesting  
13 that they were going --

14 A That is because the conditions of maneuver  
15 were different. That is why it became nightly.

16 Q Did other foreign guards hold maneuvers  
17 frequently too in China -- in Peking?

18 MR. LEVIN: We object to that as incompetent  
19 and immaterial and without the scope of the affidavit;  
20 and the rights to maneuver of the Japanese army was  
21 based on authority, and what the other armies did  
22 could not have any relation to what the Japanese army  
23 did.

24 JUDGE NYI: Your Honor, in my submission,  
25 it offers a comparison of the situation.

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 THE PRESIDENT: The purpose is to show the  
2 Japanese engaged in an excessive amount of maneuver-  
3 ing as compared with what happened in Japan and  
4 China with other troops. The objection is overruled.

5 BY JUDGE NYI (Continued):

6 Q Did you think that you could accomplish  
7 your purpose of strengthening the ties of amity  
8 with the Chinese by disturbing them at night?

9 THE PRESIDENT: That question is a bit  
10 premature. You have yet to establish that there  
11 was more maneuvering than there should have been.

12 JUDGE NYI: Excuse me.

13 Q I would like to have the witness answer  
14 to my former question: Did other foreign guards  
15 hold frequent maneuvers too?

16 A In my recollection, the night maneuvers  
17 on the part of other foreign garrisons were much, much  
18 less than Japanese. I think that arises from the  
19 fact that the Japanese policy for the education and  
20 training of troops was different.

21 Q And so you found it necessary to hold  
22 these maneuvers so frequently as to ignore the social  
23 uneasiness and anxiety of the Chinese; is that the  
24 way you think?

25 A According to our method of conducting



HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 maneuvers a certain number -- specified number --  
2 of maneuvers had to be carried on in accordance  
3 with established regulations.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Were the maneuvers special  
5 or just ordinary?

6 THE WITNESS: Ordinary maneuvers.

7 Q On page 12 of your affidavit, near the top,  
8 you mention the four points then presented to the  
9 Chinese to be performed on 19th July and you went  
10 on to state at the middle of the page beginning with  
11 (B): "If the Chinese Army does not perform these  
12 requests of ours in the period allowed, our Army  
13 will stop negotiations on the spot, and the Japanese  
14 Army will punish the 29th Army. In order to do that,  
15 the Japanese authorities will mobilize troops at  
16 home at the end of the time limit and dispatch them  
17 to North China at once."

18 Do you know that, as a matter of fact, the  
19 Japanese Cabinet had decided to dispatch troops to  
20 China on July 11? How do you explain that?

21 A All I spoke about is what we, on the spot --  
22 what instructions we, on the spot, received from the  
23 central authorities, but at that time we were not  
24 familiar as to what actually occurred in Japan itself.

25 JUDGE NYI: In this connection I wish to

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 maneuvers a certain number -- specified number --  
2 of maneuvers had to be carried on in accordance  
3 with established regulations.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Were the maneuvers special  
5 or just ordinary?

6 THE WITNESS: Ordinary maneuvers.

7 Q On page 12 of your affidavit, near the top,  
8 you mention the four points then presented to the  
9 Chinese to be performed on 19th July and you went  
10 on to state at the middle of the page beginning with  
11 (B): "If the Chinese Army does not perform these  
12 requests of ours in the period allowed, our Army  
13 will stop negotiations on the spot, and the Japanese  
14 Army will punish the 29th Army. In order to do that,  
15 the Japanese authorities will mobilize troops at  
16 home at the end of the time limit and dispatch them  
17 to North China at once."

18 Do you know, that, as a matter of fact, the  
19 Japanese Cabinet had decided to dispatch troops to  
20 China on July 11? How do you explain that?

21 A All I spoke about is what we, on the spot --  
22 what instructions we, on the spot, received from the  
23 central authorities, but at that time we were not  
24 familiar as to what actually occurred in Japan itself.  
25

JUDGE NYI: In this connection, I wish to

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 invite the Tribunal's attention to prosecution  
2 exhibit 219, which appears on page 3487 of the  
3 record which includes -- which mentions the decision  
4 of the Japanese Cabinet on 11th of July to dispatch  
5 troops to China.  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25



HASHIMOTO

CROSS

G  
r  
e  
e  
n  
b  
e  
r  
g  
&  
B  
a  
r  
t  
o  
n

1 Q Now, Mr. Witness, on page 13, middle of the  
2 page, you mention the Langfan Incident. Do you know  
3 how far is Langfan from Peking and from Tientsin?

4 A It is midway between Peiping and Tientsin.

5 Q Was it strategically important for opera-  
6 tions in the area between Peking and Tientsin?

7 A Strategically important point.

8 Q Did the Japanese bombard the Chinese from  
9 warplanes in that incident?

10 A The fighting continued from midnight to  
11 dawn, and it was toward dawn that Japanese aircraft  
12 bombed this place.

13 Q Did you find it necessary to do so?

14 A At that time we thought it was absolutely  
15 necessary. At that time it was absolutely necessary.  
16 The repair unit from the Communication Corps, consist-  
17 ing of only one company, was used at that time. As  
18 against this small force, Langfan was the headquart-  
19 ers of the 38th Division with a strength of one  
20 brigade and another company, these forces encircling  
21 the entire Langfan station.

22 THE MONITOR: "One company" is corrected to  
23 "one regiment." Langfan was the brigade headquarters  
24 of the 38th Division with the strength of one regi-  
25 ment which encircled the entire station at that time.

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1           A   (Continuing) If no measures had been taken,  
2           our very small unit of one company would have been  
3           annihilated at Langfan because they were surrounded,  
4           and, therefore, air bombing was undertaken to save  
5           them.

6           Q   How far was Langfan from Fengtai?

7           A   I do not recall the distance.

8           Q   Was it very near?

9           A   Yes. No. There was quite a distance be-  
10          tween the two points.

11          Q   Approximately how far?

12          A   Twenty or thirty kilometres, maybe more.

13          Q   That's about half an hour's ride, isn't it?

14          A   Before replying to that question, I should  
15          like to consult some references because the mileage  
16          is not in my recollection at the present moment.

17                   THE MONITOR: Reference such as maps, and  
18          so forth.

19          Q   Why couldn't you ask for reinforcement from  
20          Fengtai where you stationed troops if an exigency  
21          really existed?

22          A   They could not have been sent in time because  
23          the lines of communication had been severed, and the  
24          party which went to repair that particular line was  
25          subjected to attack.

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 Q But you realize as a soldier the serious-  
2 ness of using airforce, do you?

3 A We believed the situation was so acute that  
4 it was unavoidable.

5 Q On the same page you mentioned the Kuang-An  
6 Men Incident. You say that you gave advance notice  
7 of the entry of Japanese troops to the walled city  
8 of Peiping. How much time in advance?

9 A I do not recall definitely. The Japanese  
10 Army troops on the spot gave advance notification  
11 to the Chinese authorities there.

12 Q If you are not very clear about the situa-  
13 tion, if your recollection is not very clear, let me  
14 refresh your mind. I am reading from an affidavit  
15 by SAKURAI, who just appeared yesterday as a witness,  
16 on page 9 of his affidavit:

17 "The telegram stated that the Battalion  
18 would enter from Kuang-An Men about 4 P.M. As it  
19 seemed wise to avoid giving the Chinese enough time  
20 to excite their suspicion by informing them of the  
21 entry too early, consequently making the entry im-  
22 possible, we telephoned to Chang Wuo-chiin" --

23 THE PRESIDENT: He can't hold the balance  
24 of the question in mind so long. Do try to para-  
25 phrase.



HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 Q (Continuing) It was stated by SAKURAI  
2 that they tried to get in contact with the secretary  
3 of Ching Te-chun by 3:30 p.m. on that day, but they  
4 have failed to get him, and SAKURAI proceeded to  
5 the spot, Kuang-An Men, at 3:50 p.m., and that the  
6 troop was scheduled to come at 4:00 p.m. As no  
7 previous arrangement had been made with proper  
8 authorities, would you call it sufficient time or  
9 sufficient advance notice?

10 THE PRESIDENT: I do not know how the wit-  
11 ness can understand you; we cannot. The bench must  
12 appreciate what the question is as well as the wit-  
13 ness.

14 JUDGE NYI: May I just give him the time and  
15 ask him what he would think?

16 Q The troops were to come at 4:00 o'clock,  
17 and you tried to get to the secretary of Chin Te-chun  
18 at 3:30, but you didn't get him, and you proceeded to  
19 the spot, that is, Kuang-An Men, at 3:50 and tried  
20 to negotiate with the inferior officials on the spot.  
21 Was that sufficient advance notice?

22 A With respect to the last part of the state-  
23 ment just made by you, Mr. Prosecutor, the Tientsin  
24 garrison did not hear of that incident at Kuang-An  
25 Men until some time around or after midnight. It

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 was unable to learn of such details. But the real  
2 question is the feeling which was entertained by  
3 the headquarters -- by the Tientsin garrison head-  
4 quarters at the time it received the report of the  
5 incident at Kuang-An Men, which was this: that,  
6 after half of one battalion had gone through the  
7 walls, that is, had gone through the gate, the  
8 Chinese closed the gate and began to shoot at the  
9 other half in an attempt to annihilate the other  
10 half of the battalion. That is how the incident  
11 broke out. Up to this time the army had exercised  
12 utmost patience and forbearance in pursuit of the  
13 policy of non-aggravation of the incident. But,  
14 with the outbreak of such an incident, the camel's  
15 back, so to speak, was broken and a very serious de-  
16 cision had to be made to meet the new situation.

17 Q You are quite ahead of my question. You  
18 are trying to give me an account of the incident it-  
19 self, but I am asking you whether you really had the  
20 advance notice. Was it true that a state of emer-  
21 gency had been proclaimed by the Chinese authorities  
22 after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident?

23 A I am not clear as to what stand or position  
24 the Chinese took.

25 Q Was it true that an ultimatum had been sent

H. SHIMOTO

CROSS

1 to the Chinese authorities with regard to the Lang-  
2 fan Incident on that same day when the Kuang-An Men  
3 Incident occurred?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Considering all these circumstances, would  
6 you agree with SAKURAI that it was wise to avoid  
7 giving Chinese enough time or enough advance notice?

8 A Whether I would agree or not agree with him,  
9 it was what SAKURAI did. I do not know what actually  
10 took place. Inasmuch as SAKURAI took such a step,  
11 I should think it was wise.

12 Q How do you know that the first shot was fired  
13 by the Chinese?

14 A A report from the field.

15 Q From the field? What sort of report did  
16 you receive? From whom?

17 A From Peiping. I think it was the commander  
18 of the regiment there, but I am not quite clear. I  
19 think it was from the commander of the regiment.  
20

21 Q As Chief of Staff of the Kwantung -- of  
22 the North China garrison, did you make any investi-  
23 gation to confirm what is reported?

24 A Yes, I ordered an investigation.

25 Q Now, why did you order the troops to enter  
Kuang-An Men as there are many gates in Peking?



HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1           A    I did not issue any order.

2           Q    And did you make -- ever make any investi-  
3           gation as to why this gate was chosen, as this was  
4           a very small gate and that the proper gate to enter  
5           would be Yung Ting Men?

6           THE PRESIDENT: You cannot give evidence,  
7           Doctor. Ask him whether the other gate was the  
8           proper gate.

9           Q    (Continuing) Please answer the question.

10          A    I do not know which gate was most freq-  
11          uently used ordinarily.

12          Q    Was it for the same purpose as conceived  
13          by SAKURAI, to take the Chinese by surprise, to order  
14          the troops to go through a small gate?

15          A    I do not think that such a consideration  
16          existed.

17          THE PRESIDENT: He said the Chinese con-  
18          sented. There would be no surprise if that were so.

19          Q    Now, on page 16 you stated that this resolu-  
20          tion to wage war was not directed against China as  
21          a whole but against the 37th Division. Is the 30th  
22          Division a part of the Chinese Army?

23          THE PRESIDENT: 37th.

24          JUDGE NYI: 37th.

25          A    I think it was regular army.

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 Q Did you say that you were not waging war  
2 against China when you were fighting a part of the  
3 Chinese regular army?

4 A What is your meaning? It is not clear to  
5 me. What do you mean?

6 Q I am asking you. On page 16 you said you  
7 were not waging war against China as a whole because  
8 you were fighting against an army, a certain army.

9 A That was exactly the feeling. That was  
10 exactly the thought at that time. That is the feel-  
11 ing, to eliminate that which restricted the legiti-  
12 mate actions of the Japanese Army and threatened  
13 its existence.

14 Q You didn't answer my question.

15 THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is worth  
16 pressing now, Judge.

17 JUDGE NYI: All right.

18 Q Now, on page 17 you stated that it was the  
19 great policy of the State that had been to bring  
20 about good relations between Japan and China, and  
21 that the Japanese Army in China had never thought  
22 of going into war with that country and, consequently,  
23 had no preparation for such a war. Now, General  
24 Chin Te-chun testified in this Tribunal that you  
25 went to see him in the winter of 1936 and asked him

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 for buying of land in order to build barracks and  
2 air fields. What was the necessity of that?

3 A First of all, the idea that I went to see  
4 Chin Te-chun is groundless. As I have stated at  
5 the end of my affidavit, the request for land was  
6 made because the barracks at Tung-chow happened to  
7 be located in a very circumscribed area where sani-  
8 tary conditions were poor and the ground unfit for  
9 training, and that is why a request was made for  
10 more appropriate land in the vicinity. The idea of  
11 establishing an airfield did not exist in our minds  
12 at the time.

13 Q Did you see General Chin Te-chun about it?

14 A Yes, once.

15 Q You pressed for the same purpose?

16 A Yes, for that purpose.

17 Q Now, on page 18 of your affidavit you  
18 stated that there were persons who fired in order  
19 to tempt the Chinese to open fire illegally on both  
20 Japanese and the Chinese forces.

21 THE MONITOR: Will the court reporter  
22 please repeat that?

23 (Whereupon, the last question was  
24 read by the official court reporter.)  
25

JUDGE NYI: Excuse me. It was wrong. I



HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 should not say "fired" -- to tempt the Chinese to  
2 open fire illegally which both the Japanese and the  
3 Chinese forces were in a state of mutual suspense;  
4 and I take it that a "which" should be substituted  
5 by a "why."

6 THE MONITOR: Mr. Prosecutor, that is a  
7 difficult task for the Language Section to do because  
8 the grammatical structure is different.

9 JUDGE NYI: I think the meaning is "why,"  
10 if I don't propose for a correction as I have not  
11 the right to do.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Stop at the word "illegally,"  
13 and you will have your question sufficiently full.

14 JUDGE NYI: All right.

15 Q Did you get my question, Mr. Witness?

16 A Yes, I so stated.

17 Q Now, since you state that this firing was  
18 to tempt the Chinese, and, judging from the position,  
19 it is very likely that the shooting came from nearer  
20 to the Japanese side; was it true?

21 A We understood this on the basis of reports  
22 from the field. We were not familiar with such de-  
23 tails.

24 Q You stated in your affidavit, and I take it  
25 that you have an exact situation in mind, so I wish

1 you will elaborate on this -- the position of the  
2 shooting, as I think it is a very important question.

3 MR. LEVIN: I submit, Mr. President, the  
4 question has already been answered, and he's testi-  
5 fied that he was not there and the information he  
6 gave was from a report that he received.

7 THE PRESIDENT: The exact point from which  
8 the firing came won't help the Bench. Apparently,  
9 the firing was on the Chinese, if it occurred.

10 Q I just have another topic in mind to cross-  
11 examine you, Mr. Witness. That is with respect to  
12 the Kih Tung Anti-Communism Autonomy. You mentioned  
13 them on page 3 of your affidavit, that Kih Tung Anti-  
14 Communism Autonomy, with Yin Ju-keng as its chief,  
15 was evidently separated from the Nanking Government,  
16 and it stood for an independent regime. Do you know  
17 when was that first organized?

18 A I think it was toward the end of 1935.

19 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen  
20 minutes.

21  
22 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was  
23 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings  
24 were resumed as follows:)  
25

1 you will elaborate on this -- the position of the  
2 shooting, as I think it is a very important question.

3 MR. LEVIN: I submit, Mr. President, the  
4 question has already been answered, and he's testi-  
5 fied that he was not there and the information he  
6 gave was from a report that he received.

7 THE PRESIDENT: The exact point from which  
8 the firing came won't help the bench. Apparently,  
9 the firing was on the Chinese, if it occurred.

10 Q I just have another topic in mind to cross-  
11 examine you, Mr. Witness. That is with respect to  
12 the Kih Tung Anti-Communism Autonomy. You mentioned  
13 them on page 3 of your affidavit, that Kih Tung Anti-  
14 Communism Autonomy, with Yin Ju-keng as its chief,  
15 was evidently separated from the Nanking Government,  
16 and it stood for an independent regime. Do you know  
17 when was that first organized?

18 A I think it was toward the end of 1935.

19 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen  
20 minutes.  
21

22 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was  
23 taken until 1500, after which the proceed-  
24 ings were resumed as follows:)  
25



HASHIMOTO

CROSS

D  
u  
d  
a  
&  
W  
h  
a  
l  
e  
n

1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nyi.

4 DR. NYI: I wish to call the attention of the  
5 Tribunal to the fact that the word 'Kihtung,' I suppose  
6 it was rarely used before, referred to the Eastern  
7 Hopei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Regime. They were  
8 the same thing.

9 Q Does the witness agree with that?

10 A Yes, I know.

11 Q Now, I was asking you when was it first  
12 organized. And now my next question is; was it the  
13 accused DOHIHARA who was responsible for its creation?

14 A I do not think he was responsible for its  
15 creation.

16 Q Do you know that he was sent by the accused  
17 MINAMI to North China in 1935 to organize or promote  
18 autonomy of the five provinces, provincial autonomy,  
19 and failing to do that he created that Kihtung Regime?

20 MR. LEVIN: I object to that question on the  
21 ground that it is beyond the scope of the affidavit  
22 and the testimony of the witness.

23 THE INTERPRETER: The witness just replied:  
24 I do not know anything about that.

25 THE PRESIDENT: He shouldn't be asked to deny

1 it twice. He denied it in the first case. He said  
2 DOHIHARA had nothing to do with it.

3 Q Now, Mr. Witness, you stated that Kihitung  
4 was maintaining independence from Nanking Regime.  
5 What sort of relation you have with the Kihitung Regime?

6 A We were related with the East Hopei Regime  
7 because this was within the geographical scope of the  
8 assignment and duty of the China garrison.

9 Q Was it consistent with your policy of strength-  
10 ening the ties between Japan and China?

11 A Yes; consistent I think.

12 Q You mean it wouldn't hurt the feeling of the  
13 Nanking Government to recognize or to have anything to  
14 do with the Kihitung Regime which had an entirely inde-  
15 pendent status?

16 A This was an entirely internal affair with  
17 China, and it was our policy not to connect ourselves  
18 in any way with the establishment or actions of a  
19 political nature with such internal regimes.

20 Q Do you know anything about the Tungchow Inci-  
21 dent on 20th of July 1937?

22 A Yes. I am familiar with the fact that taking  
23 advantage of the fact that Japanese troops were ex-  
24 tremely short-handed, the Peace Preservation Corps,  
25 that is, the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps carried

HASHIMOTO

CROSS

1 on a large-scale massacre of Japanese residents at  
2 Tungchow.

3 Q But the Kihung Government was all the time  
4 under the domination of Japanese influences, wasn't  
5 it?

6 A It is not a fact that the East Hopei Regime  
7 was dominated by the influence of Japan. It is a fact,  
8 however, that amicable relations were maintained with  
9 that regime.

10 DR. NYI: Mr. President, this concludes my  
11 cross-examination.

12 MR. LEVIN: There will be no further examina-  
13 tion, Mr. President. May the witness be excused on  
14 the usual terms?

15 THE PRESIDENT: He is excused accordingly.

16 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

17 MR. LEVIN: I now call the witness TANAKA,  
18 Shinichi.

19 MR. TAVENNER: If your Honor please--

20 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Tavenner.

21 MR. TAVENNER: I notice that the next document  
22 on the order list is another affidavit by the same  
23 witness who just testified. I would merely like to  
24 inquire whether the affidavit offered is to be the  
25 sole affidavit used, or whether this affidavit is



TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

20,668

1 proposed to be used in a subsequent phase?

2 MR. LEVIN: I had overlooked that matter,  
3 Mr. President, I intended to state that it is in-  
4 tended to use that affidavit in a subsequent phase.

5 - - -

6 S H I N I C H I T A N A K A, called as a witness  
7 on behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,  
8 testified through Japanese interpreters as  
9 follows:

10 DIRECT EXAMINATION

11 BY MR. LEVIN:

12 Q Please state your name, age and address.

13 A Name, TANAKA, Shinichi; age 54; address  
14 No. 2042 Suizawa-mura, Mie County, Mie Prefecture.

15 Q The Marshal of the Court will hand you de-  
16 fense document No. 925. Will you please state whether  
17 your signature appears thereon?

18 A Yes.

19 Q Are the contents of the said document true  
20 and correct?

21 A True and correct.

22 MR. LEVIN: I offer in evidence defense  
23 document No. 925, which is the affidavit of the witness,  
24 TANAKA, Shinichi.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No. 925  
2 will receive exhibit No. 2488.

3 (Whereupon, the document above re-  
4 ferred to was marked defense document No. 2488  
5 and received in evidence.)

6 MR. LEVIN: I shall omit the formal part.

7 "I. I, TANAKA, Shinichi, formerly a lieutenant-  
8 general, live at No. 2,042, Mizawa-mura Yokoseko, Mie  
9 District, Mie Prefecture.

10 "I occupied the post of the chief of the  
11 Military Affairs Section, War Service Bureau, War  
12 Ministry, from March of 1937 to February of 1939, and  
13 had charge of the affairs concerning the organization,  
14 equipment, budget, mobilization and reinforcement of  
15 our forces, under the command of the director of the  
16 bureau.

17 "It was about the middle of March, 1937, that  
18 I arrived at my post. When I paid a visit of courtesy  
19 to Minister of War SUGIYAMA, he pointed out that the  
20 time had come to try strenuously to avoid all foreign  
21 troubles and devote ourselves to the completion of  
22 national defense; that the Army would try to modernize  
23 its armaments and particularly to improve and complete  
24 its war materials; and that the Military Affairs Sec-  
25 tion should make a special effort to improve the

organization and equipment of our forces.

1           "II. As to whether or not our Japanese Army  
2 had a plan of operations against China before the out-  
3 break of the China Incident, the General Staff Head-  
4 quarters of the Japanese Army had no plan of opera-  
5 tions for the war with China before the outbreak of  
6 the China Incident. While I was engaged in the affairs  
7 concerning the organization, reinforcement and mobili-  
8 zation of our forces, as the Chief of the Military Af-  
9 fairs Section, War Service Bureau, War Ministry, I  
10 never received any report or information concerning  
11 the mobilization and operational preparation necessary  
12 for any plan of operations against China, either from  
13 the General Staff or from the superior authorities.  
14 This means that the General Staff had no preparatory  
15 plan of this kind at that time. For the plan of opera-  
16 tions as well as that of mobilization and operational  
17 preparation were just in its charge, but the realization  
18 of such plans was necessarily accompanied by the strength,  
19 munitions and expenditure. Therefore they could not  
20 be realized without the approval and cooperation of  
21 the War Ministry, and the Chief of Military Affairs  
22 Section would have had to be informed of the business  
23 concerning such plans, all the more so because I  
24 arrived at my post in March -- at the end of the fiscal  
25



1 year.

2 "III. As to whether or not the Japanese Army  
3 was then so situated as to be able to attempt Chinese  
4 operations in China, in view of the strength and  
5 munitional materials of the Japanese Army at that  
6 time, it would have been almost impossible to attempt  
7 operations in China.

8 "1. In 1937, when the China Incident broke  
9 out, Japan had only a peace-time strength of 17 divi-  
10 sions and a war-time one of 30 divisions. In the  
11 judgment of the General Staff as well as of the War  
12 Minister, as later referred to in this affidavit, it  
13 was very dangerous for the Army to operate in China  
14 with the fighting strength available at the time in  
15 view of the fact that China had a force 20,000,000  
16 strong (200 divisions), and a vast land as well as the  
17 social idiosyncracies of the Chinese people.

18 "In addition, we had to be greatly concerned  
19 in the Russian military preparations in the Far East.  
20 According to the information received by the General  
21 Staff as to the Russian preparations for war with  
22 Japan, she had a standing peace-time strength of 28  
23 sniper divisions, 45 cavalry divisions, 6 mechanized  
24 brigades and 1,900 aircraft for the Far East, including  
25 the Siberian Military District, together with a

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 peace-time force of 10 cavalry divisions and some  
2 mechanized units and air units for Outer Mongolia.  
3 The minimum war-time strength that she could use against  
4 Japan amounted to 31 or 50 divisions, of which mobil-  
5 ization, concentration and reinforcement were to be  
6 sufficiently secured. It was concluded, therefore,  
7 that it would be dangerous and inadvisable to carry out  
8 operations in China under such circumstances, taking  
9 into consideration the movements of the Soviet Union.  
10 In this connection, after the Marco Polo Bridge Inci-  
11 dent broke out in July, 1937, the General Staff gave  
12 the following explanation:

13 'Considering the Chinese situation, the  
14 present incident is liable to turn into a head-on,  
15 protracted war between Japan and China. If so, we  
16 could use only 11 divisions in these Chinese operations,  
17 or, adding the reserve corps of the Army, 15 divisions  
18 in total. But, if we should use half our war-time  
19 strength, totalling 30 divisions on the plan of mobil-  
20 ization, in the Chinese Area for a long time, then we  
21 are sure to meet with a serious crisis from the view-  
22 point of national defense. So it is necessary to take  
23 every possible measure for the immediate settlement  
24 of the incident.'

25 "As I was present when this explanation was

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 made, I know that the War Minister was in entire  
2 accordance with the explanation.



1           "2. The production and maintenance of  
2 munitions were under as much difficulty and disadvantage  
3 as the above-mentioned problem of military strength.

4           "According to the Mobilization Plans Bureau  
5 of the War Ministry, having charge of the production  
6 and maintenance of munitions it was very difficult  
7 to mobilize and dispatch about 15 divisions and even  
8 to maintain operations in the incident at the time, in  
9 view of our conditions of production and supply of  
10 munitions. In 1937, our Army had only an eight months'  
11 stock of ammunition for fifteen divisions. As to the  
12 ability of munitions mobilization, we could barely hope  
13 to meet the operational consumption of 15 reinforced  
14 divisions in about eight or nine months after the mobi-  
15 lization was commenced, and a continuous supply of  
16 special materials was impossible. As regards the arms,  
17 supposing that we were able to use all the arms we had  
18 in stock and bring our munition mobilization to a  
19 maximum, it would have been difficult to meet the  
20 operational consumption of 15 divisions, and this was  
21 especially the case with special materials. Therefore,  
22 if we should go to a protracted war with China, it  
23 would not be sufficient to use all the stocks and max-  
24 imum munitions mobilization in the operations in China,  
25 and if our relations with another country should be

1strained under such circumstances, we were sure to be  
2at a loss what to do for self-defence. Generally  
3speaking, with our anticipated munitions mobilization  
4for 1937, and guaranteed a supply of 70 per cent of  
5munitions, including arms and ammunitions, for the  
6estimated war-time strength of 30 divisions for the  
7fiscal year, we planned to be able to mobilize in  
8about ten months after such munitions mobilization was  
9commenced. However, far more materials were expected  
10to be consumed in the China Incident, so we admitted  
11that it was extremely difficult to maintain operations  
12with 15 divisions.

13"IV. Data indicating that the incident was  
14not planned from the Japanese point of view.

15"In addition to the data in the Above II and  
16III, I wish to refer to the following:

17"1. Establishment of non-enlargement and  
18non-exercise of military strength. On July 8, when  
19the Army was informed of the clash at the Marco Polo  
20Bridge early in the morning, it immediately determined  
21the general policy of non-enlargement of the incident  
22as well as non-exercise of military strength, and  
23informed the Chief of the Staff of the Army at the  
24front to that effect through the Vice-Chief of the  
25General Staff. This I know from documents. About

1 July 8 or 9, the Imperial Government established the  
2 policy of non-enlargement, desiring for the smooth  
3 settlement of the incident by reconsideration on the  
4 part of China, and simultaneously decided to take  
5 proper measures for self-preservation, according to  
6 the circumstances, though it was too early to send  
7 more forces at that time. This I heard from Lieutenant  
8 General USHIROKU, Director of the War Service Bureau  
9 who was informed thereof in the Bureau-directors  
10 Council by the War Minister.

11 "2. Effort for speedy settlement at the front.  
12 On July 9, the General Staff instructed the army at  
13 the front to negotiate with the Hopei-Chahar authori-  
14 ties for the settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Inci-  
15 dent, which I know from documents. The gist was to  
16 avoid reference to political issues under such circum-  
17 stances, and to obtain the approval of the Hopei-Chahar  
18 Political Committee and fulfil as soon as possible our  
19 demands, such as the suspension of stationing the  
20 Chinese forces on the left bank near the Marco Polo  
21 Bridge, its necessary guarantee, and the punishment  
22 and apology of those persons directly responsible.

23 "According to the reports which I received  
24 from the army at the front, our occupation forces in  
25 China prohibited promptly any military movement,



1 following the policy of non-enlargement of the inci-  
2 dent and its speedy settlement at the front. In order  
3 to save the situation, Major General MATSUI, Daikuro,  
4 Chief of the Peiping Special Service Agency, was  
5 negotiating with the Chinese military authorities, and  
6 it seemed that an agreement would be reached in con-  
7 formity to the above-mentioned policy of negotiation  
8 with Hopei-Chahar.

9 "However, according to the information  
10 received by the General Staff, the Chinese authorities  
11 ordered four divisions of her central army near Suchow  
12 to march for the frontier of the Honan Province and  
13 all her air forces to move out. Moreover, there was  
14 no indication that the northern Chinese situation  
15 might be mitigated; the Chinese forces in North China  
16 were strengthening preparations for war, such as  
17 construction of their positions or transport of muni-  
18 tions, and also illegal firing was being repeated near  
19 the Marco Polo Bridge.

20  
21 "If the state of affairs had been left as it  
22 was, the lives and properties of our residents in  
23 Peking and Tientsin would surely have been forced to  
24 face unavoidable danger. Thus the General Staff HQ's  
25 was compelled to adopt the following judgment of the  
situation:

1        "The authorities in Peking and Tientsin as  
2 well as the Nanking Government, seem to be exerting  
3 themselves to prepare for armed hostilities against  
4 Japan. As a result of the aggravation of the situation,  
5 caused by the reinforcement of Chinese troops in North  
6 China, the lives and properties of our residents are,  
7 now, on the verge of utmost danger. It is high time  
8 for us now to dispatch a minimum possible number of  
9 forces to the Peking-Tientsin area, in order to protect  
10 our residents. A grave situation is arising also in  
11 areas other than Peking and Tientsin, which comes to  
12 call our careful attention with regard to protection  
13 of our nationals.'

14        "I was informed of the above adoption by the  
15 report and explanation of a high class officer of the  
16 Military Affairs Section.

17        "IV. Our government made the following point  
18 clear in an official statement on 11 July, that we  
19 were utterly compelled to send forces to North China  
20 to cope with anti-Japanese armed actions, planned by  
21 the Chinese side. But upon being informed that the  
22 Hopei-Chahar Government authorities had accepted our  
23 proposal, we took steps, in the afternoon on the same  
24 day, as to reserve our preparation for the mobilization  
25 and dispatch of our home divisions. Furthermore,

1 orders were issued by the General Staff HQ's, with the  
2 approval of the Government, to dispatch only a part  
3 of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, and of the Chosen  
4 Army respectively. The latter step was taken in view  
5 of the situation as mentioned above, to ensure the  
6 achievement of peace-time duty by our garrison in  
7 China under aggravated situation in the Peiping-Tientsin  
8 area.

9 "V. According to an information I got around  
10 13 July from the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau,  
11 the outcome of the Cabinet Conference was as follows:

12 "'It is extremely doubtful whether the Nanking  
13 Government has the sincerity to settle the matter in  
14 peace. For the Chinese Central Army forces are now  
15 advancing hastily to the north and anti-Japanese actions  
16 and unlawful firing cases are being repeated everywhere.  
17 Thus not only in North China but also in Shanghai and  
18 Chingtao the situation is very dangerous in regard to  
19 the protection of the Japanese residents there. There-  
20 fore, it will be advisable for us in accordance with  
21 our firm policy of localization, to pay constant atten-  
22 tion to the future course of things; urging on the one  
23 hand, the Hopei-Chahar Government to fulfil the sti-  
24 pulated terms, and abstaining on the other hand from  
25 provoking the Chinese.'



1 "In conformity with this principle, the  
2 governing body of the General Staff and of the War  
3 Ministry decided upon the so-called 'policy for the  
4 settlement of the North China Incident' on the night  
5 of 13 July.  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

S  
p  
r  
a  
t  
t  
&  
Y  
e  
l  
d  
e  
n

1 The outline of the above 'policy' is as  
2 follows:

3 "All possible measures should be taken to  
4 avoid the expansion of the incident to an all-out  
5 war, adhering to the principle of localization and  
6 settlement at the spot. For this purpose, it is  
7 desirable to accept the terms for settlement proposed  
8 by the representative of the Chinese 29th Army and  
9 signed on 11th instant, and to see to it that these  
10 terms are fulfilled by the Chinese. Whether or not  
11 our forces now in homeland should be mobilized is a  
12 matter to be decided in the light of the future course  
13 of things. In case however the Chinese ignore the  
14 above terms and show no sincerity to put it into  
15 practice, or in case the Nanking Government removes  
16 their central army forces to the north to prepare for  
17 attack, resolute steps must be taken on our part.'

18 "It was that it is necessary for the garri-  
19 sons stationing in China to receive beforehand the  
20 recognition of the central headquarters. This was  
21 what Lieutenant-General ATOMIYA who was the Chief of  
22 the Army Affairs Bureau participating in setting up  
23 the plan (regulation) reported directly to me.

24 "VI. As I was connected with mobilization,  
25 I wish to explain the real circumstances under which

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 mobilization and dispatch were carried out with  
2 cautious attitude.

3 "A. It was a fact acknowledged by the  
4 government on July 9th when the incident broke out  
5 that the mobilization and dispatch of divisions at  
6 home might be necessary to meet the emergency cir-  
7 cumstances, although it was not considered necessary  
8 at the beginning of the incident. (I knew this through  
9 the Chief of the Army Affair Bureau as a report from  
10 the minister after a cabinet meeting.)

11 "B. Taking consideration of the dangerous  
12 state of Japanese residents in the Peking and Tientsin  
13 district, increasing preparation of fighting power  
14 and repeated attacks of Chinese forces in the same  
15 district, as well as the insincerity of Hopei-Chahar  
16 authorities in negotiations of reconciliation and  
17 the northward advancement of the Chinese central  
18 armies, the Japanese Government announced on 11 July  
19 the dispatch of troops to North China.

20 "C. But in the afternoon of July 11th, as the  
21 Hopei-Chahar authorities accepted our proposal, the  
22 mobilization and dispatch of divisional troops at home  
23 and other preparations were discontinued.

24 "D. On 13 July it was decided as the policy  
25 of dealing with the North China Incident that the



1 mobilization of divisions at home would be considered  
2 properly according to circumstances which might occur  
3 afterwards.

4 "E. As a new circumstance which appeared up  
5 to 15 July I mention an increase and concentration of  
6 Chinese armies in the area of the north Lanchow-Haichow  
7 railway, the activity of the Canton air forces, the  
8 delay of actual withdrawal of the Chinese Army forces  
9 from the left side along Yungtinho, which withdrawal  
10 had been accepted by an agreement. Not only that,  
11 further construction was continued and more army  
12 forces were concentrated (a report from the General  
13 Headquarters). Considering the above report, it was  
14 decided at a cabinet meeting that the carrying out  
15 of mobilization of divisional armies at home which  
16 had been discontinued on 16 or 17 July should be pre-  
17 pared as to be practicable whenever necessary after  
18 19 July. The officers and officials concerned in the  
19 General Headquarters and the War Ministry proceeded  
20 with preparations in their respective sections. But  
21 the authorities decided to persevere as much as possible  
22 considering self-defense, as the Hopei-Chahar author-  
23 ities accepted once our proposals, in spite of the  
24 report that Chiang Kai-shek revealed his firm determina-  
25 tion against Japan on 19 July. Besides the acceptance

1 of the Hopei-Chahar authorities, expecting the con-  
2 clusions of the Nanking Conference, the preparation  
3 for mobilization of divisional armies at home was  
4 postponed and reserved for the future on 22 July.

5 "F. After the Langfang Incident on 25 July  
6 and the Kwangan Gate Incident on 26 July the condition  
7 in North China became finally serious. A report was  
8 received from a higher officer stating that the Japan-  
9 ese Government had decided upon a program on 27 July  
10 to mobilize and dispatch divisional armies at home.  
11 And the purpose of the mobilization and dispatch was  
12 to eliminate the threat of the Chinese forces to the  
13 lives and property of Japanese residents and transport-  
14 ation and communication and also accomplishment of  
15 self-defense of the already dispatched garrison troops  
16 in North China. The mobilization and dispatch at  
17 first for the time being were emergency operations  
18 with peace-time formation and equipment not suitable  
19 or sufficient for actual operations. These operations  
20 were only for the purpose of protecting the Japanese  
21 residents and to carry out the duty of self-defense.

22 "G. There was no definite expression of  
23 intention of the authorities of the General Headquarters  
24 whether further mobilization of divisional armies at  
25 home would be carried out or not in the future besides

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 the above stated one. I recognized that the Minister,  
2 the Vice-Minister of the War Ministry and the Chief  
3 of the Military Affair Bureau, who were the highest  
4 staff authorities, maintained a passive attitude in  
5 regard to further mobilization.

6 "H. Since then higher officers adopted the  
7 policy of taking proper steps in regard to further  
8 mobilization after consideration and investigation of  
9 developments which might occur in the future. When  
10 the Shanghai Incident broke out, two divisions were  
11 sent to cope with the emergency and when it became  
12 urgently necessary to protect the residents of Tsintao,  
13 a plan to send out one division was set up and when  
14 faced with the necessity of carrying out operations  
15 in the area of Paoting, Hopei Province in Central  
16 China, a hasty mobilization at home was begun. As  
17 above stated, patching and supplementary mobilization  
18 and dispatch were carried out as circumstances required.  
19 Eventually after the outbreak of the incident up to  
20 October 1937, army forces totaling 15 divisions were  
21 mobilized and dispatched on eight different occasions,  
22 to say roughly 4 divisions in July, 7 divisions in  
23 August, and 4 divisions in September and October.

24 "I. In 1938, prior to the execution of opera-  
25 tions in Hankao and Canton, the number of the divisions



1 in China reached 23 but among them there were several  
2 divisions which were organized in the fighting zone as  
3 the circumstances required. Therefore, although the  
4 number of army divisions in China increased generally,  
5 the number of soldiers decreased in each division and  
6 the predisposition of each division and equipment were  
7 lowered.

8 "VII. As examples of lack of unity and non-  
9 planning of military action, I wish to make mention of  
10 the capture of Nanking operations in Hsu-Chow, capture  
11 of Kuangtung and operations in Hankow.

12 "The following is necessary confines of my  
13 duties as announced by the General Staff and other  
14 quarters.

15 "1. Concerning the capture of Nanking, I  
16 was, at first, informed by the Chief of the Military  
17 Affairs Bureau that the General Staff had no inten-  
18 tion to realize it and the War Minister had the same  
19 opinion as the General Staff. I approved of this.  
20 But because of the tendency of the tide of war on  
21 the spot and because of the desire to seize the  
22 opportunity of terminating this incident, the decision  
23 to capture Nanking was firstly decided on December 1,  
24 1937 (the 12th year of Showa) and the order for the  
25 taking Nanking was issued.

1 "2. Carrying out of the Hsu-Chow operations.

2 "In May 1938 (the 13th year of Showa), an  
3 agreement of views between the War Minister and Vice-  
4 Chief of the General Staff was not reached until  
5 immediately before the decision to carry out opera-  
6 tions was made. The point at issue was that if it  
7 was possible to preserve the contact between North  
8 China and Central China by securing permanently the  
9 important area of Hsu-Chow after the occupation of  
10 this area and to supply needed army strength because  
11 of the necessity to increase by 2 or 3 divisions the  
12 strength necessary for securing the important area  
13 of Hsu-Chow, but the fundamental fact was the dis-  
14 agreement of views as to the anticipation of settling  
15 this incident in accordance with the policy of non-  
16 expansion.

17 "Finally, agreement of views to carry out  
18 this military operation was arrived at due to strategic  
19 demand in the light of the entire situation. Part of  
20 it, I personally heard at the above-mentioned confer-  
21 ence and the rest I learned from my superiors.

22 "3. As to the Hankow and Kuangtung operations,  
23 decision was not made so quickly. Only in September  
24 1938 it was decided to carry out the Hankow operation  
25 about October 1938 and capture Kuangtung about that

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 time to cut the communication and supply route from  
2 abroad.

3 "4. Under these circumstances, the army  
4 budget passed at the ordinary session of the Diet in  
5 1938 had not anticipated these military operations.  
6 Therefore a great deal of inconvenience was felt in  
7 the matter of expenses for the year as explained in  
8 the following:

9 "VIII. I, as one of the men who were con-  
10 nected with the military budget, wish to state as  
11 follows by way of proposing materials to indicate that  
12 the operations in Hsu-Chow, Hankow and Kwantung were  
13 not planned well before they actually occurred. After  
14 about October 1937, in Tokyo, prospects were enter-  
15 tained for putting an end to the positive operations  
16 against China and, moreover, plans and preparations  
17 were promoted regarding the adjustment of and extraction  
18 from the military strength in China, on the premise  
19 that the Incident would be concluded in the near future.  
20 To explain more in detail, at about the end of 1937,  
21 our military strength in China consisted of 16 divisions,  
22 forming its main part. As the first step, these were  
23 to be reduced to about 10 divisions. Following this,  
24 in the units, which were to remain in China, the re-  
25 servists were to be relieved from active service. The



TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 enforcement of this program was first to be started  
2 from the early spring of 1938, and, pursuant to the  
3 anticipated establishment of peace, an all-round  
4 withdrawal of the armed forces was planned. With  
5 respect to this matter, both the department quarters  
6 and the outpost army authorities were unanimous in  
7 their opinion.

8 "Accordingly, the budget, agreed upon at  
9 the ordinary session of the Diet at that time, was  
10 also based on the above; namely, it was made on the  
11 premise that (1) the military strength in China was  
12 to be reduced roughly by half; (2) the repatriation of  
13 those troops who had been inducted; (3) the continued  
14 stationing of armed forces to such an extent as to  
15 presuppose no positive operations.

16 "But, as it was, the situation did not  
17 favorably develop as was expected, and after the  
18 occupation of Nanking, the failure of peace negotia-  
19 tions and the consequent operations in Hsu-Chow,  
20 Hankow and Kwantung necessitated the total abandonment  
21 of the attempted adjustment of the military strength  
22 as aforementioned, not only this but in the 1938-1939  
23 fiscal year an enormous deficiency was found in the  
24 budget.

25 "IX. I wish to submit the following materials

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 about how the military budget was actually prepared.  
2 About the expenditures of our expeditionary forces  
3 which were sent to Korea and Manchuria on July 11,  
4 1937, I was asked by my superiors in the War Ministry  
5 to negotiate with the Finance Ministry with a view  
6 to meet current expenses with a reserve fund and to  
7 open a three months' budget covering August, September  
8 and October for the troops that had already been sent,  
9 including their evacuation expenditures and supposing  
10 their stay to be about three months. But in fact,  
11 after negotiation with the Finance Ministry it was  
12 reduced to two months. A budget for two months of  
13 August and September was presented at an extraordinary  
14 session of the Diet in July and passed. A budget for  
15 four months from October till January of the next year  
16 for about 11 divisions already mobilized by the end of  
17 August passed at a session convened at the beginning  
18 of September.

19 "Thus budgets were prepared little by little  
20 according to the number of the expeditionary forces,  
21 instead of making a wholesale estimation for a long  
22 period in expectation of aggravation and protraction  
23 of the incident. This is also clear by the fact that  
24 the budget for the fiscal year of 1938 proved greatly  
25 deficient as hereinbefore stated.

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 "X. Realization of Japan's policy of non-  
2 aggravation.

3 "1. What I have already stated shows efforts  
4 to realize a policy of non-aggravation.

5 "2. As a reference to strict execution of  
6 non-aggravation policy on the spot, I wish to mention  
7 a verbal report made to the Minister of War, in my  
8 hearing, by Lt. Col WACHI, a staff officer of the  
9 expeditionary forces in China, who had been called up  
10 to the central government to make a report of the  
11 situation developing on the spot.

12 "Its gist is as follows:

13 "The policy of non-aggravation and peaceful  
14 settlement of the incident was thoroughly disseminated  
15 to the commanders and all the rest of the Japanese  
16 forces in North China and utmost care was being taken  
17 for it. For instance, the transportation of any  
18 Japanese troops was prohibited by the railway between  
19 Peking and Tientsin. Any Japanese soldier in uniform  
20 was also prohibited to make use of the railway between  
21 Fengtai and Peking.

22 "And though all the Japanese who passed through  
23 the gate of the Peking Castle were examined and inter-  
24 rogated by the Chinese military police, they submitted to  
25 it.



TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 "Every castle gate in Peking was closed by  
2 the military force of the Chinese 37th Division,  
3 Chinese machine guns were turned upon the Japanese  
4 houses within Peking Castle, and 6,000 Japanese were  
5 guarded by only two Japanese infantry platoons.

6 "In spite of being in a position enabling us  
7 to go into action immediately against any Chinese  
8 bombardment, we were operating upon the instructions  
9 of the Army headquarters in Tientsin as they came to  
10 us one by one. Being afraid of aggravating the sit-  
11 uation, we refrained from carrying the wounded into  
12 Peking Castle to be operated upon; likewise we left  
13 the bodies of the dead as they were, etc. This was  
14 but an example of our policy of localization to  
15 prohibit actions which might provoke a magnification  
16 of the incident. Thus to carry out this policy, we  
17 submitted to any humiliation or inconvenience.

18 "As for the Chinese forces, anti-Japanese  
19 sentiment was high among officers and soldiers alike,  
20 and especially among those in the grade of second  
21 major. The Chinese in the Pingtsin area were con-  
22 vinced that the Chinese 29th Army had won at Marco  
23 Polo Bridge, that the Chinese losses were small and  
24 that the Japanese Army had completely withdrawn. We  
25 endured the rising anti-Japanese sentiment.

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 "In addition, it was said that the  
2 Central Operations Staff had advanced to Paoting.

3 "3. Concerning the strict observance of  
4 the localization policy of the local Army Commander,  
5 I will state what General TERAUCHI, the Army Commander  
6 in the North China area, told me when I was there  
7 about October 1937 (Showa 12), for liaison work.

8 "That was as follows:

9 "Hitherto the Central Supreme Command has  
10 made the technique of leading actual operations  
11 difficult by not clearly showing beforehand the  
12 general purpose of operations and the points of  
13 operation. Instead they have simply given the purpose  
14 and time of each local operation (such as the Central  
15 Hopei operation and the Taiyuan operation). To  
16 facilitate operations the Supreme Command should  
17 clearly show the general scope and purpose of the  
18 operations as a whole and leave the details of local  
19 operations to the Army Commander at the front. However,  
20 this case being merely an 'incident' and having no  
21 bearing on our general national policy, it is necessary  
22 to sacrifice perfection in technique to the preserva-  
23 tion of our general localization policy. In the future,  
24 it will be necessary for both the central and local  
25 commands seriously to consider various technical

20,694

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 methods which would relieve the disadvantage to  
2 actual operation brought about by strict observa-  
3 tion of the localization policy.  
4

5 "4. On the policy of localization in the  
6 Pingtsin area in July 1937 (Showa 12) it was decided  
7 that the occurrence of the Langfang and Kwangan  
8 Gate Incidents, together with the lack of sincerity  
9 on the part of the Hopei-Chahar authorities to ful-  
10 fill the terms of agreement as well as the aggressive  
11 actions repeated everywhere by the Chinese, made it  
12 at last necessary to mobilize our divisions now in  
13 the homeland.  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25



TANAKA , S.

DIRECT

1 "On the night of July 26 the General Staff  
2 gave me a notice: 'Hitherto we have avoided the  
3 mobilization of the home divisions but the actual  
4 situation in China admits of no further delay.'  
5 Even the then Chief of the First Department of the  
6 General Staff, who was one of the strongest opponents  
7 to the mobilization of forces for fear of conflict  
8 between Japan and China, at last admitted on the  
9 26th the necessity of mobilization by way of self-  
10 defense.

11 "On the 27th the governing body of the  
12 War Ministry also recognized the unavoidability of  
13 mobilization.

14 "Then a draft was prepared for adoption  
15 by the Cabinet conference concerning the mobiliza-  
16 tion of three home divisions, and the War Minister  
17 issued orders in the evening of the same day with  
18 the approval of the Cabinet conference about the  
19 mobilization of three home divisions.

20 "After a meeting of the Bureau Chiefs, I  
21 was informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs  
22 Bureau that on the 27th of July the government had  
23 decided as follows:

24 "To mobilize three home divisions; to  
25 maintain the policy of localization and settlement

1 at the spot even in case of the outbreak of a  
2 self-protective battle in the Pingtsin Area, such  
3 a battle should be purely for the achievement of the  
4 peacetime duties of the commander of the Japanese  
5 Army in China; to do its best not to bring about  
6 a situation which might require dispatching soldiers  
7 to Tsingtao and Shanghai for the protection of  
8 Japanese residents -- though such a situation may  
9 eventually come about; and to do no damage to the  
10 personnel of third powers.

11 "Besides I learned that the Minister gave  
12 an explanation at the said meeting of the Bureau  
13 Chiefs to the following effect:

14 "Exercise of military force in Pingtsin  
15 Area which might be required in the future would  
16 be purely self-defensive action and as such it  
17 would never be contradictory to the policy of  
18 localization adhered to by Japan. And even if  
19 dispatch of forces to Shanghai or Tsingtao should  
20 be required for the protection of the Japanese  
21 whose security was being seriously menaced at that  
22 time, it would never run counter to the policy of  
23 localization. And the actions of the Japanese  
24 forces had hitherto been in strict conformity with  
25 the localization of military movements, and could

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 and should remain so in the future as well.

2 "I also learned from a document that  
3 the mobilization of home divisions was ordered in  
4 the evening of the 27th, and the Chief of the Gen-  
5 eral Staff approved the application of the Com-  
6 mander of the Japanese Army in China for taking  
7 military action against the Chinese 29th Army,  
8 and that at the same time he ordered that the  
9 actual shooting be limited to the line of the  
10 Yungting River.

11 "5. I was informed by the Chief of the  
12 Military Affairs Bureau that at the Five Ministers'  
13 Meeting held about the 20th of July, they debated  
14 upon the advisability of the Japanese policy to  
15 improve the situation by taking means to clarify  
16 our observance of the principle of equal opportunity  
17 in North China, in order to satisfy the Western  
18 Powers, as well as China herself; and upon the plan  
19 to withdraw the forces at that time in the Pingtsin  
20 area, which had been dispatched there from Manchuria  
21 and Korea after the settlement of the Marco Polo  
22 Bridge Incident, and then to take diplomatic means  
23 for the solution of questions pending between Japan  
24 and China. The Five Ministers' Meeting was a  
25 conference held at the time by the Prime Minister,



TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 Foreign Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister, and  
2 the Finance Minister. I also heard directly that  
3 at the end of July there was an opinion among the  
4 governing body of the General Staff that contem-  
5 plated neutralizing the situation by gathering and  
6 moving all the Japanese forces in North China back  
7 to the area of Tientsin in order to bring about  
8 prompt settlement of the incident, and then to hold  
9 a personal interview between KONOYE and Chiang  
10 Kai-shek, and thus to smooth out the difficulty  
11 between Japan and China. However, since the  
12 attitude on the part of the Chinese was against this  
13 plan, it was not realized after all.

14 "6. Circumstances after the OYAMA Incident  
15 at Shanghai:

16 "About the Incident Captain OYAMA, I re-  
17 ceived a report on the morning of the 10th of  
18 August 1932 in the War Ministry from HOSHINO, the  
19 Chief of the First Section of the Navy Ministry.  
20 It purported that the Japanese authorities in  
21 Shanghai would not take further steps until they  
22 were assured of the sincerity of the Chinese by  
23 negotiating with them, and that the circumstances  
24 might require preparations for dispatch of troops.  
25

"On that day the government authorities

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 seemed to be of the opinion that adequate measures  
2 for the protection of our residents in Shanghai  
3 should be taken after the real circumstances of  
4 the OYAMA Incident came to light, but that it would  
5 be worthwhile to study the Navy Minister's proposal  
6 demanding preparations for eventual mobilization as  
7 a last resort. But I learned later that on the  
8 13th, the Cabinet conference took up a plan to  
9 dispatch forces, and that on the 14th this plan was  
10 being subjected to reconsideration. Then a state-  
11 ment was made by the Imperial Government on August 15,  
12 In accordance with this statement it was decided to  
13 dispatch a 'despatched force' to Shanghai of which  
14 two divisions from the homeland formed the main  
15 body, for the purpose of protecting the Japanese  
16 subjects in Shanghai. The word 'despatched force'  
17 was used to show that it had nothing to do with pure  
18 military operations thoroughly. The mobilization for  
19 this purpose was ordered on August 15.

20 "As for Tsingtao, I heard that it was  
21 talked about at the Cabinet conference that the  
22 situation in Tsingtao being calm it would be possible  
23 to maintain the status quo, provided that nothing  
24 happened to disturb it, but some measure would be  
25 taken for the protection of residents there in case

TANANAK, S.

DIRECT

1 the worst should happen.

2 "About August 15 or 16, 1937, the General  
3 Staff concluded that the Chinese had decided upon  
4 the policy of beginning over-all military operations.  
5 This conclusion was based on the report that the  
6 Chinese had established headquarters on August 15th,  
7 made Chiang Kai-Shek Supreme Commander of all the  
8 land, sea and air forces and divided the whole  
9 country into four war zones (the 1st war zone,  
10 Hopei-Chahar; the 2nd, Chahar-Shansi; the 3rd,  
11 Shanghai, the 4th, South China), and that general  
12 mobilization was ordered on the same day.

13 "About the 16th or 17th of August, I was  
14 duly notified at the meeting of the Bureau Chiefs  
15 as usual that the following has been decided at  
16 the Cabinet conference:

17 "It is becoming difficult to solve the  
18 affair in strict conformity with the policy of  
19 localization, as the Chinese have determined to  
20 carry out a long war. Therefore, the utmost efforts  
21 should be made to restrict the war to the minimum  
22 in point of time as well as strategically, and  
23 territorially.

24 "As the original object of the Shanghai  
25 operations lay chiefly in the protection of the



1 Japanese residents, they had to be confined to a  
2 minimum. To check the danger of creating a general  
3 clash between Japan and China on the one hand, and  
4 to avoid trouble with other countries on the other,  
5 Japan at first dispatched less than two divisions  
6 temporarily with the idea of carrying out the  
7 operations with minimum forces. Nevertheless, the  
8 difference of forces between Japan and China was so  
9 great that the war situation did not take a favorable  
10 turn as it was expected. The central Supreme Com-  
11 mand, therefore, dispatched first five battalions  
12 during the period from the end of September to the  
13 beginning of November, and then five more divisions  
14 from North China; in addition, the beginning of  
15 November three divisions landed at Hangchow and  
16 again in the middle of that month one division landed  
17 at Paimaokiang. By supplying forces temporarily as  
18 stated above, the battle continued for three months,  
19 and at last in the middle of November the Chinese  
20 Army made a general retreat to the west. Thus the  
21 operations which were executed to protect the  
22 residents in Shanghai were brought to a conclusion.  
23 But the fact that Japan was obliged to use forces in  
24 such a way as was considered to be an error from a  
25 viewpoint of strategy shows the circumstance under

TANAKA, S.

DIRECT

1 which Japan was curbed by her own policy of localiz-  
2 ing the incident. In fact, General SUGIYAMA, ex-  
3 Minister of War, who was afterwards appointed Com-  
4 mander of the North China Expeditionary Army,  
5 pointed out these circumstances, saying that the  
6 delay in occupying Shanghai was an important cause  
7 that prolonged the incident, but the fundamental  
8 cause lay in the numerical shortage in military  
9 forces and amount of materials, so the Japanese  
10 policy of solving the incident in a short time  
11 should have been carried out more thoroughly. The  
12 General told me so personally when I made a business  
13 trip to North China in the winter of 1938 (Showa 12).  
14 He was then the Commander of the North China Expe-  
15 ditionary Army.

16 "The headquarters of the Shanghai Expe-  
17 ditionary Force was reorganized into the headquarters  
18 of the Central China Expeditionary Force, and at the  
19 same time was entrusted with the duty of operating in  
20 the vicinity of Shanghai with the aim of creating an  
21 opportunity to settle the incident. This meant that  
22 the authorities wanted to find an opportunity of  
23 settling the incident in the operations near Shanghai,  
24 and had no intention of capturing Nanking at that  
25 time. After the battle near Shanghai the Central

1 Authorities of the Supreme Command instructed  
2 our forces not to advance beyond the line of  
3 Changshu-Soochow-Kashing so as not to give an un-  
4 necessary provocation to Nanking. Later I learned  
5 from documents that confidential instructions had  
6 been given to the forces not to enlarge the theatre  
7 of operations further west than Wusih and Fuchow.

8 "8. In our country the Imperial Head-  
9 quaters Ordinance was enacted on November 17,  
10 1937, and the Imperial Headquarters was established  
11 in Tokyo for the first time on November 20 of the  
12 same year.

13 "In the same month the munitions mobiliza-  
14 tion program was begun. However, the order for the  
15 national general mobilization had not yet been put  
16 into force (T. N. in that year).

17 "The General Mobilization Law was pro-  
18 mulgated in March of the following year, that is,  
19 1938. But it was in May 1938 that a part of the  
20 law was applied for the China Incident.

21 "With this I bring my affidavit to an end."

22 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half-  
23 past nine tomorrow morning.

24 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment  
25 was taken until Thursday, 24 April 1947, at 0930.)

- - - -